Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Jerrold J. Katz, S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum and Stephen Read
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16 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
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17535
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Dispositionality has its own distinctive type of modality [Mumford/Anjum]
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14579
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Dispositionality is the core modality, with possibility and necessity as its extreme cases [Mumford/Anjum]
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14580
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Dispositions may suggest modality to us - as what might not have been, and what could have been [Mumford/Anjum]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
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11001
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Equating necessity with truth in every possible world is the S5 conception of necessity [Read]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
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14552
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Relations are naturally necessary when they are generated by the essential mechanisms of the world [Mumford/Anjum]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
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14578
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Possibility might be non-contradiction, or recombinations of the actual, or truth in possible worlds [Mumford/Anjum]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
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10989
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The standard view of conditionals is that they are truth-functional [Read]
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11017
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Some people even claim that conditionals do not express propositions [Read]
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10992
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The point of conditionals is to show that one will accept modus ponens [Read]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
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14185
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Conditionals are just a shorthand for some proof, leaving out the details [Read]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
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14549
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Maybe truths are necessitated by the facts which are their truthmakers [Mumford/Anjum]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
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10983
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Knowledge of possible worlds is not causal, but is an ontology entailed by semantics [Read]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
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10982
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How can modal Platonists know the truth of a modal proposition? [Read]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
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10996
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Actualism is reductionist (to parts of actuality), or moderate realist (accepting real abstractions) [Read]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
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10981
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A possible world is a determination of the truth-values of all propositions of a domain [Read]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
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11000
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If worlds are concrete, objects can't be present in more than one, and can only have counterparts [Read]
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