Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Immanuel Kant and Penelope Mackie
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these philosophers
display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
17 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
18797
|
Modalities do not augment our concepts; they express their relation to cognition [Kant]
|
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
5594
|
Natural necessity is the unconditioned necessity of appearances [Kant]
|
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
18795
|
A concept is logically possible if non-contradictory (but may not be actually possible) [Kant]
|
5566
|
Is the possible greater than the actual, and the actual greater than the necessary? [Kant]
|
5613
|
The analytic mark of possibility is that it does not generate a contradiction [Kant]
|
21410
|
That a concept is not self-contradictory does not make what it represents possible [Kant]
|
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
6181
|
Necessity cannot be extracted from an empirical proposition [Kant]
|
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
18796
|
Formal experience conditions show what is possible, and general conditions what is necessary [Kant]
|
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
23461
|
Kant thought worldly necessities are revealed by what maths needs to make sense [Kant, by Morris,M]
|
14710
|
Necessity is always knowable a priori, and what is known a priori is always necessary [Kant, by Schroeter]
|
16256
|
For Kant metaphysics must be necessary, so a priori, so can't be justified by experience [Kant, by Maudlin]
|
5524
|
Maths must be a priori because it is necessary, and that cannot be derived from experience [Kant]
|
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
11887
|
Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P]
|
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11890
|
De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P]
|
11892
|
Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P]
|
11893
|
Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P]
|
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
11884
|
The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P]
|