Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Melvin Fitting, Theodore Sider and Ludwig Wittgenstein
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24 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
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9442
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The only necessity is logical necessity [Wittgenstein]
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13721
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'Strong' necessity in all possible worlds; 'weak' necessity in the worlds where the relevant objects exist [Sider]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
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13707
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Maybe metaphysical accessibility is intransitive, if a world in which I am a frog is impossible [Sider]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
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13709
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Logical truths must be necessary if anything is [Sider]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
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13716
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'If B hadn't shot L someone else would have' if false; 'If B didn't shoot L, someone else did' is true [Sider]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
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15030
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Humeans say that we decide what is necessary [Sider]
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15031
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Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language [Sider]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
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15028
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Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori [Sider]
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18726
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For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language [Wittgenstein]
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15027
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If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent [Sider]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
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15033
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Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works [Sider]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
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15025
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The world does not contain necessity and possibility - merely how things are [Sider]
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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
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23495
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The tautologies of logic show the logic of language and the world [Wittgenstein]
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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
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23487
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What is thinkable is possible [Wittgenstein]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
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23470
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Each thing is in a space of possible facts [Wittgenstein]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
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23507
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Unlike the modern view of a set of worlds, Wittgenstein thinks of a structured manifold of them [Wittgenstein, by White,RM]
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23469
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An imagined world must have something in common with the real world [Wittgenstein]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
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11027
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To know an object you must know all its possible occurrences [Wittgenstein]
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23465
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The 'form' of an object is its possible roles in facts [Wittgenstein]
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15377
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Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting]
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13717
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Transworld identity is not a problem in de dicto sentences, which needn't identify an individual [Sider]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
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14763
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Counterparts rest on similarity, so there are many such relations in different contexts [Sider]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
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12869
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Two objects may only differ in being different [Wittgenstein]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
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13719
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Barcan Formula problem: there might have been a ghost, despite nothing existing which could be a ghost [Sider]
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