Combining Philosophers
Ideas for New Scientist writers, Willard Quine and Martin Kusch
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9 ideas
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
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15782
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Quine wants identity and individuation-conditions for possibilia [Quine, by Lycan]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
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9014
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Some conditionals can be explained just by negation and conjunction: not(p and not-q) [Quine]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
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15725
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Normal conditionals have a truth-value gap when the antecedent is false. [Quine]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
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15722
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Conditionals are pointless if the truth value of the antecedent is known [Quine]
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22432
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Normally conditionals have no truth value; it is the consequent which has a conditional truth value [Quine]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
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15719
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We feign belief in counterfactual antecedents, and assess how convincing the consequent is [Quine]
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15721
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Counterfactuals are plausible when dispositions are involved, as they imply structures [Quine]
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15724
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Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science [Quine]
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15720
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What stays the same in assessing a counterfactual antecedent depends on context [Quine]
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