Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Penelope Maddy, Thomas Mautner and Trenton Merricks
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9 ideas
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
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6886
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Counterfactuals are not true, they are merely valid [Mautner]
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6885
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Counterfactuals are true if in every world close to actual where p is the case, q is also the case [Mautner]
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6884
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Counterfactuals say 'If it had been, or were, p, then it would be q' [Mautner]
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6883
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Maybe counterfactuals are only true if they contain valid inference from premisses [Mautner]
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14417
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Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base [Merricks]
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6882
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Counterfactuals presuppose a belief (or a fact) that the condition is false [Mautner]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
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5449
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Essentialism is often identified with belief in 'de re' necessary truths [Mautner]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
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6133
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If my counterpart is happy, that is irrelevant to whether I 'could' have been happy [Merricks]
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14402
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If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker [Merricks]
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