Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Pittacus, Frank Jackson and Alan Turing

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17 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
6987 We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity [Jackson]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
3016 Even the gods cannot strive against necessity [Pittacus, by Diog. Laertius]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
14360 Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives? [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
14288 'If A,B' affirms that A⊃B, and also that this wouldn't change if A were certain [Jackson, by Edgington]
13769 Conditionals are truth-functional, but should only be asserted when they are confident [Jackson, by Edgington]
13858 The truth-functional account of conditionals is right, if the antecedent is really acceptable [Jackson, by Edgington]
14289 There are some assertable conditionals one would reject if one learned the antecedent [Jackson, by Edgington]
14353 Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F [Jackson]
14354 When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth [Jackson]
14355 (A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
14358 In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated [Jackson]
14359 Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions [Jackson]
14357 Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
14356 We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance [Jackson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
14631 How can you show the necessity of an a posteriori necessity, if it might turn out to be false? [Jackson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
6988 Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework [Jackson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
6975 Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties [Jackson]