Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Prodicus, Zoroaster and David Lewis
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6 ideas
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
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15560
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We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
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A conditional probability does not measure the probability of the truth of any proposition [Lewis, by Edgington]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
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14361
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Lewis says indicative conditionals are truth-functional [Lewis, by Jackson]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
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8434
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In good counterfactuals the consequent holds in world like ours except that the antecedent is true [Lewis, by Horwich]
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8425
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For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis]
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Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents [Lewis]
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