Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Robert Hanna, Gareth Evans and C.J. Thomae
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6 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
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11083
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A sentence is necessary if it is true in a set of worlds, and nonfalse in the other worlds [Hanna]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
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11086
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Metaphysical necessity can be 'weak' (same as logical) and 'strong' (based on essences) [Hanna]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
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11084
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Logical necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds, because of laws and concepts [Hanna]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
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11085
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Nomological necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds with our laws [Hanna]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
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14895
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'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification [Evans, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
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11881
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Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty [Evans, by Mackie,P]
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