Combining Philosophers
Ideas for William W. Tait, Sigmund Freud and E.J. Lowe
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13 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
15079
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'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws [Lowe]
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16533
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Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities [Lowe]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
16063
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Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed' [Lowe, by Lynch/Glasgow]
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16531
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'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity [Lowe]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
8260
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Logical necessity can be 'strict' (laws), or 'narrow' (laws and definitions), or 'broad' (all logical worlds) [Lowe]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
16131
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The metaphysically possible is what acceptable principles and categories will permit [Lowe]
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4195
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It is impossible to reach a valid false conclusion from true premises, so reason itself depends on possibility [Lowe]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
16532
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'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty' [Lowe]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
16543
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If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary [Lowe]
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16544
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Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths [Lowe]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
4207
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We might eliminate 'possible' and 'necessary' in favour of quantification over possible worlds [Lowe]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
8320
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Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world? [Lowe]
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16538
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We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences [Lowe]
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