Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Xenophon, Timothy Williamson and Ludwig Feuerbach
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10 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
14625
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Necessity is counterfactually implied by its negation; possibility does not counterfactually imply its negation [Williamson]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
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Strict conditionals imply counterfactual conditionals: □(A⊃B)⊃(A□→B) [Williamson]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
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Counterfactual conditionals transmit possibility: (A□→B)⊃(◊A⊃◊B) [Williamson]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
14531
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Rather than define counterfactuals using necessity, maybe necessity is a special case of counterfactuals [Williamson, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
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We can't infer metaphysical necessities to be a priori knowable - or indeed knowable in any way [Williamson]
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9598
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Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson]
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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
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Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson]
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9596
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We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
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Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson]
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18925
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If talking donkeys are possible, something exists which could be a talking donkey [Williamson, by Cameron]
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