display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
4 ideas
| 18712 | Understanding is translation, into action or into other symbols [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Understanding is really translation, whether into other symbols or into action. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], B I.5) | |
| A reaction: The second part of this sounds like pure pragmatism. To do is to understand? I doubt it. Do animals understand anything? |
| 6600 | The belief that fire burns is like the fear that it burns [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: The belief that fire will burn me is of the same kind as the fear that it will burn me. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §473) | |
| A reaction: Most of our beliefs are forced on us, rather than chosen, and this nice remark gives an indication of the reason. It dovetails with Peirce's pragmatic approach to be belief (e.g. Idea 6598), which is well developed by Robert Fogelin. |
| 4153 | Are sense-data the material of which the universe is made? [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Are sense-data the material of which the universe is made? | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §401) | |
| A reaction: Presumably the question is meant to be absurd, and to a realist it is. You can't serious think that a filing cabinet is made of sensations. |
| 23503 | Strict solipsism is pure realism, with the self as a mere point in surrounding reality [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.64) | |
| A reaction: Despite this, Michael Morris is more inclined to see him as an idealist. It is not clear whether the present account of solipsism is idealist or realist. Berkeley seemed to think his idealism was true realism. Can reality be co-ordinated with a point? |