19424
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Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Knowledge is either obscure or clear; clear ideas are either indistinct or distinct; distinct ideas are either adequate or inadequate, symbolic or intuitive; perfect knowledge is that which is both adequate and intuitive.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283)
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A reaction:
This is Leibniz's expansion of Descartes's idea that knowledge rests on 'clear and distinct conceptions'. The ultimate target seems to be close to an Aristotelian 'real definition', which is comprehensive and precise. Does 'intuitive' mean coherent?
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19332
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For Leibniz, divine understanding grasps every conceivable possibility [Leibniz, by Perkins]
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Full Idea:
For Leibniz, what is this understanding which God has? What does it contain? All possibilities in all possible combinations, that is, everything which can be conceived.
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From:
report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.III
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A reaction:
I like this, because it strikes me as essential that understanding should embrace possibilities as well as actualities. Perkins points out that the possibilities are restricted by an awareness of the limitations imposed by combination.
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19334
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I can't just know myself to be a substance; I must distinguish myself from others, which is hard [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
It is not enough for understanding the nature of myself, that I feel myself to be a thinking substance, one would have to form a distinct idea of what distinguishes me from all other possible minds; but of that I have only a confused experience.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.07.4/14)
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A reaction:
Not a criticism I have encountered before. Does he mean that I might be two minds, or might be a multitude of minds? It seems to be Hume's problem, that you are aware of experiences, but not of the substance that unites them.
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13003
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The Cogito doesn't prove existence, because 'I am thinking' already includes 'I am' [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
To say 'I think therefore I am' is not really to prove existence from thought, since 'to think' and 'to be thinking' are one and the same, and to say 'I am thinking' [je suis pensant] is already to say 'I am' [je suis].
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 4.07)
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A reaction:
This is the objection which was offered by A.J. Ayer, and I take it to the one of the two principle objections to the Cogito (i.e. that it may be a tautology), along with the objection about the assumption of the continuity of the same thinker.
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12739
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If we are dreaming, it is sufficient that the events are coherent, and obey laws [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Skeptics may doubt the truth of things, and if it pleases them to call the things that occur to us dreams, it suffices for these dreams to be in agreement with each other, and to obey certain laws.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (On Perceptions [1680], A6.4.1398), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7
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A reaction:
Leibniz flirted a great deal with phenomenalism throughout the middle of his career, as charted by Garber. Descartes made similar points. It is really only Berkeley who took this idea seriously.
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12742
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A whole is just its parts, but there are no smallest parts, so only minds and perceptions exist [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
The whole, if it is assumed to be body or matter, is nothing other than all of its parts; but this is absurd, since there aren't any smallest parts. Therefore there really exist only minds and their perceptions.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Calculus Ratiocinator [1679], A6.4.279), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 7
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A reaction:
Leibniz is sometimes labelled as an 'idealist', but this text is unusual in being so explicit, and he was mainly concerned to explain the reality of individual bodies. Monads were his final attempt to do this, not an attempt to escape into pure minds.
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5509
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Leibniz said dualism of mind and body is illusion, and there is only mind [Leibniz, by Martin/Barresi]
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Full Idea:
Leibniz held that dualism of mind and body is an illusion and that both are really the same thing, and that this thing is mind.
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From:
report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by R Martin / J Barresi - Introduction to 'Personal Identity' p.22
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A reaction:
I am puzzled by this, as Leibniz is famous for the view that mind and body are parallel. See idea 5038, and also 2109 and 2596. Monads are, of course, entirely mental, and are the building blocks of reality. Clearly I (and you) must read more Leibniz.
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