Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Bonaventura, Peter E. Pormann and Roger Scruton

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4 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge [Scruton]
     Full Idea: In my view the concept of knowledge is of no very great interest in epistemology, which actually concerns the justification of belief.
     From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 22)
     A reaction: I think this is an excellent thought. I see knowledge as slippery, and partially contextual, and I don't care whether someone precisely 'knows' something. I just want to know why they believe it.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
Having beliefs involves recognition, expectation and surprise [Scruton]
     Full Idea: With the concept of belief (e.g. in animals) comes recognition, expectation and surprise.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.15)
     A reaction: A good observation. It is always tempting to see mental faculties in isolation, but each one drags along other capacities with it. Looks a bit holistic.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
If an animal has beliefs, that implies not only that it can make mistakes, but that it can learn from them [Scruton]
     Full Idea: To say that an animal has beliefs is to imply not just that it can make mistakes, but also that it can learn from them.
     From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.15)
     A reaction: A bold claim which is hard to substantiate. Seems right, though. Why would they change a belief? It can't be a belief if it isn't changeable. That would be an instinct.
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness [Scruton]
     Full Idea: In the course of the argument the first person has acquired a character; he is not merely conscious, but self-conscious.
     From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 4)