Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Hermarchus, Alexander Nehamas and Harr,R./Madden,E.H.

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2 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas]
     Full Idea: The Greek 'episteme' is usually translated as 'knowledge' but, I argue, closer to our notion of understanding.
     From: Alexander Nehamas (Introduction to 'Virtues of Authenticity' [1999], p.xvi)
     A reaction: He agrees with Julia Annas on this. I take it to be crucial. See the first sentence of Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'. It is explanation which leads to understanding.
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
It is silly to say that direct experience must be justified, either by reason, or by more experience [Harré/Madden]
     Full Idea: It would be silly to suggest that what is a matter of experience must be justified by reason, and it makes no sense to say that what we are insisting upon as a matter of direct experience must itself be established by experience.
     From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 3.II)
     A reaction: The first half is now known as the 'Moorean' view (Idea 6349). It does make sense, when faced with a weird experience, to assess and establish it by means of a combination of reason and other experiences. It's called 'coherence'!