display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
3 ideas
| 19526 | Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: When I ask myself what I am acquainted with, the physical objects in front of me are far more natural candidates than their appearances. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (Knowledge First (and reply) [2014], p.3) | |
| A reaction: Not very impressive. The word 'acquainted' means the content of the experience, not the phenomena. Do I 'experience' the objects, or the appearances? The answer there is less obvious. If you apply it to colours, it is even less obvious. |
| 4153 | Are sense-data the material of which the universe is made? [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Are sense-data the material of which the universe is made? | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §401) | |
| A reaction: Presumably the question is meant to be absurd, and to a realist it is. You can't serious think that a filing cabinet is made of sensations. |
| 23503 | Strict solipsism is pure realism, with the self as a mere point in surrounding reality [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.64) | |
| A reaction: Despite this, Michael Morris is more inclined to see him as an idealist. It is not clear whether the present account of solipsism is idealist or realist. Berkeley seemed to think his idealism was true realism. Can reality be co-ordinated with a point? |