display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
5 ideas
| 3816 | Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle] |
| Full Idea: The terminology of "propositional attitudes" is confused, because it suggests that a belief is an attitude towards a propositions, …but the proposition is the content, not the object, of my belief. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.2) |
| 3833 | A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle] |
| Full Idea: A belief is a commitment to truth. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.4.III) |
| 3837 | We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle] |
| Full Idea: If I lie and say "It is raining", my utterance is intelligible to me as a lie precisely because I understand that the utterance commits me to the truth of a proposition I do not believe to be true. | |
| From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.6.II) |
| 3490 | Beliefs only make sense as part of a network of other beliefs [Searle] |
| Full Idea: To have one belief or desire, I have to have a whole network of other beliefs and desires. | |
| From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 8.I) |
| 3491 | Beliefs are part of a network, and also exist against a background [Searle] |
| Full Idea: We need to postulate a network of beliefs, and also a background of capacities that are not themselves part of the network. | |
| From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 8.I) |