display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
6 ideas
19424 | Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Knowledge is either obscure or clear; clear ideas are either indistinct or distinct; distinct ideas are either adequate or inadequate, symbolic or intuitive; perfect knowledge is that which is both adequate and intuitive. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283) | |
A reaction: This is Leibniz's expansion of Descartes's idea that knowledge rests on 'clear and distinct conceptions'. The ultimate target seems to be close to an Aristotelian 'real definition', which is comprehensive and precise. Does 'intuitive' mean coherent? |
19397 | Perfect knowledge implies complete explanations and perfect prediction [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The mark of perfect knowledge is that nothing appears in the thing under consideration which cannot be accounted for, and that nothing is encountered whose occurrence cannot be predicted in advance. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Wisdom [1693], 1) | |
A reaction: I would track both of these back to the concept of perfect understanding, which is admittedly a bit vague. Does a finite mind need to predict every speck of dust to have perfect knowledge? Do we have perfect knowledge of triangles? |
19332 | For Leibniz, divine understanding grasps every conceivable possibility [Leibniz, by Perkins] |
Full Idea: For Leibniz, what is this understanding which God has? What does it contain? All possibilities in all possible combinations, that is, everything which can be conceived. | |
From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Franklin Perkins - Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed 2.III | |
A reaction: I like this, because it strikes me as essential that understanding should embrace possibilities as well as actualities. Perkins points out that the possibilities are restricted by an awareness of the limitations imposed by combination. |
12960 | We understand things when they are distinct, and we can derive necessities from them [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: We understand the things of which we are aware only when we have distinct ideas of them accompanied by the power to reflect and to derive necessary truths from those ideas. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.21) | |
A reaction: A rather startling way of putting it, but we also say that good understanding brings the power to predict. What must you understand in order to predict? What has to happen next! |
12998 | Understanding grasps the agreements and disagreements of ideas [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Ordinarily, when ideas are thoroughly understood, their agreements and disagreements are apparent. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 4.02) | |
A reaction: In other words, there is a holistic aspect of understanding, which makes us ask how understanding ever gets off the ground. Is it not possible to understand a single idea in isolation? |
8808 | Involuntary beliefs can still be evaluated [Feldman/Conee] |
Full Idea: Examples confirm that beliefs may be both involuntary and subject to epistemic evaluation. | |
From: R Feldman / E Conee (Evidentialism [1985], II) | |
A reaction: This is an extremely important point, which summarises the situation with beliefs that arise from (apparent) immediate perception. A belief cannot possibly be knowledge if it has been triggered, but no effort was made to evaluate it. |