Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Stilpo, Fred Dretske and L. Jonathan Cohen

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2 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Belief is the power of metarepresentation [Dretske]
     Full Idea: Belief is the power of metarepresentation.
     From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §2.3)
     A reaction: Hm. I have always defined belief as 'commitment to truth', and this definition leaves out both parts. Where is the commitment? If hope is another metarepresentation, how does it differ from belief? I imagine things, not believing them to be true.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
A mouse hearing a piano played does not believe it, because it lacks concepts and understanding [Dretske]
     Full Idea: A mouse can see and hear a piano being played, but believing is something else; it requires the concept of a piano, and understanding. Mice who hear pianos being played do not believe pianos are being played.
     From: Fred Dretske (Naturalizing the Mind [1997], §1.3)
     A reaction: Are we to say that when a mouse hears a piano it has no beliefs at all? Might not a belief involve images, so that a mouse calls up appropriate images from previous experiences, which are in a grey area on the edge of belief?