Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Charles Sanders Peirce, Nicholas Hill and Catherine Z. Elgin
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11 ideas
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
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19089
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Our whole conception of an object is its possible practical consequences [Peirce]
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
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7660
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We are aware of beliefs, they appease our doubts, and they are rules of action, or habits [Peirce]
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
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6940
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The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce]
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6941
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We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce]
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6942
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We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce]
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6943
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A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce]
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14781
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A 'belief' is a habit which determines how our imagination and actions proceed [Peirce]
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19223
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We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions [Peirce]
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11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
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19107
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Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog [Peirce]
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14770
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Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce]
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14768
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Infallibility in science is just a joke [Peirce]
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