Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Donald Davidson, Erik J. Olsson and A.J. Ayer
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12 ideas
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
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11145
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Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken [Davidson]
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
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8806
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The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson]
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
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6397
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The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community [Davidson]
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8867
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A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson]
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11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
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5183
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Only tautologies can be certain; other propositions can only be probable [Ayer]
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11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
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19459
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To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer]
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19460
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'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer]
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19461
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Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer]
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11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
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6525
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Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door' [Robinson,H on Ayer]
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5170
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Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents [Ayer]
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8824
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No one has defended translational phenomenalism since Ayer in 1940 [Ayer, by Kim]
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2614
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Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer]
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