Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Eurytus, Hecato and Bertrand Russell
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18 ideas
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
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5431
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Knowledge cannot be precisely defined, as it merges into 'probable opinion' [Russell]
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16482
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All our knowledge (if verbal) is general, because all sentences contain general words [Russell]
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6430
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In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell]
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
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5426
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Belief relates a mind to several things other than itself [Russell]
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5780
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The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell]
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
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5366
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We have an 'instinctive' belief in the external world, prior to all reflection [Russell]
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11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
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17637
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The most obvious beliefs are not infallible, as other obvious beliefs may conflict [Russell]
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11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
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5359
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Descartes showed that subjective things are the most certain [Russell]
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11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
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4758
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Naïve realism leads to physics, but physics then shows that naïve realism is false [Russell]
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11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
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21537
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I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations' [Russell]
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5377
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'Acquaintance' is direct awareness, without inferences or judgements [Russell]
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11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / c. Representative realism
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6510
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Russell (1912) said phenomena only resemble reality in abstract structure [Russell, by Robinson,H]
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5372
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There is no reason to think that objects have colours [Russell]
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21580
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Science condemns sense-data and accepts matter, but a logical construction must link them [Russell]
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11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
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6466
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Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell]
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6418
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Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling]
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11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
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5373
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'Idealism' says that everything which exists is in some sense mental [Russell]
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11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
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5362
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It is not illogical to think that only myself and my mental events exist [Russell]
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