Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Jonathan Dancy, Crawford L. Elder and Friedrich Nietzsche

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24 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
20126 The strength of knowledge is not its truth, but its entrenchment in our culture [Nietzsche]
4537 We can't know whether there is knowledge if we don't know what it is [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
24150 We can only understand through concepts, which subsume particulars in generalities [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
20258 Most people treat knowledge as a private possession [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
14875 Belief matters more than knowledge, and only begins when knowledge ceases [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
4485 Every belief is a considering-something-true [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
4421 Philosophers have never asked why there is a will to truth in the first place [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
7154 We can't use our own self to criticise our own capacity for knowledge! [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
14858 Being certain presumes that there are absolute truths, and means of arriving at them [Nietzsche]
4487 A note for asses: What convinces is not necessarily true - it is merely convincing [Nietzsche]
2745 A pupil who lacks confidence may clearly know something but not be certain of it [Dancy,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
2755 If senses are fallible, then being open to correction is an epistemological virtue [Dancy,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
7146 Belief in the body is better established than belief in the mind [Nietzsche]
23201 The 'I' does not think; it is a construction of thinking, like other useful abstractions [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
5677 Naïve direct realists hold that objects retain all of their properties when unperceived [Dancy,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
14866 It always remains possible that the world just is the way it appears [Nietzsche]
5678 Scientific direct realism says we know some properties of objects directly [Dancy,J]
5681 Maybe we are forced from direct into indirect realism by the need to explain perceptual error [Dancy,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / c. Representative realism
5682 Internal realism holds that we perceive physical objects via mental objects [Dancy,J]
5683 Indirect realism depends on introspection, the time-lag, illusions, and neuroscience [Dancy,J, by PG]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
23207 Appearance is the sole reality of things, to which all predicates refer [Nietzsche]
2778 Phenomenalism includes possible experiences, but idealism only refers to actual experiences [Dancy,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
5684 Eliminative idealists say there are no objects; reductive idealists say objects exist as complex experiences [Dancy,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
2777 Extreme solipsism only concerns current experience, but it might include past and future [Dancy,J]