Combining Philosophers
Ideas for William W. Tait, Friedrich Nietzsche and Tom Clark
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13 ideas
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
20126
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The strength of knowledge is not its truth, but its entrenchment in our culture [Nietzsche]
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4537
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We can't know whether there is knowledge if we don't know what it is [Nietzsche]
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
24150
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We can only understand through concepts, which subsume particulars in generalities [Nietzsche]
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
20258
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Most people treat knowledge as a private possession [Nietzsche]
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
14875
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Belief matters more than knowledge, and only begins when knowledge ceases [Nietzsche]
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
4485
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Every belief is a considering-something-true [Nietzsche]
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
4421
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Philosophers have never asked why there is a will to truth in the first place [Nietzsche]
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
7154
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We can't use our own self to criticise our own capacity for knowledge! [Nietzsche]
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11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
14858
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Being certain presumes that there are absolute truths, and means of arriving at them [Nietzsche]
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4487
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A note for asses: What convinces is not necessarily true - it is merely convincing [Nietzsche]
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11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
7146
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Belief in the body is better established than belief in the mind [Nietzsche]
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11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
14866
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It always remains possible that the world just is the way it appears [Nietzsche]
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11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
23207
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Appearance is the sole reality of things, to which all predicates refer [Nietzsche]
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