display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
7 ideas
| 9158 | For Frege a priori knowledge derives from general principles, so numbers can't be primitive [Frege] |
| Full Idea: If one took the numbers as primitive, one would not be deriving their existence and character from general principles- thus controverting Frege's view of the nature of an a priori subject. | |
| From: Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]), quoted by Tyler Burge - Frege on Apriority II | |
| A reaction: He seems to be in tune with Leibniz on this. His view begs the obvious question of where the general principles come from. I would have thought that relationships between concepts might be known a priori, without principles being involved. |
| 16887 | Frege's concept of 'self-evident' makes no reference to minds [Frege, by Burge] |
| Full Idea: Frege's terms that translate 'self-evident' usually make no explicit reference to actual minds. | |
| From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Tyler Burge - Frege on Knowing the Foundations 4 | |
| A reaction: This follows the distinction in Aquinas, between things that are intrinsically self-evident, and things that are self-evident to particular people. God, presumably, knows all of the former. |
| 8657 | Mathematicians just accept self-evidence, whether it is logical or intuitive [Frege] |
| Full Idea: The mathematician rests content if every transition to a fresh judgement is self-evidently correct, without enquiring into the nature of this self-evidence, whether it is logical or intuitive. | |
| From: Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §90) | |
| A reaction: Note the suggestion that there are two different sorts of self-evidence. But see Idea 1410. Frege presumably drifted into philosophy because he wasn't happy with this blissful ignorance. |
| 16894 | An apriori truth is grounded in generality, which is universal quantification [Frege, by Burge] |
| Full Idea: Generality for Frege is simply universal quantification; what makes a truth apriori is that its ultimate grounds are universally quantified. | |
| From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Tyler Burge - Frege on Apriority (with ps) 2 |
| 9352 | An a priori truth is one derived from general laws which do not require proof [Frege] |
| Full Idea: If the proof of a truth can be derived exclusively from general laws, which themselves neither need nor admit of proof, then the truth is a priori. | |
| From: Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §03) | |
| A reaction: Presumably the unproved general laws from which the derivation comes are more securely a priori, as are the principles used to make the derivation. As Frege says, he is trying to spell out Kant's view; see Idea 9345. |
| 16889 | A truth is a priori if it can be proved entirely from general unproven laws [Frege] |
| Full Idea: If it is possible to derive a proof purely from general laws, which themselves neither need nor admit of proof, then the truth is a priori. | |
| From: Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §03), quoted by Tyler Burge - Frege on Apriority (with ps) 1 | |
| A reaction: Burge brings out the contrast with Kant, for whom a priori truths are derived from particular facts, not general ones. |
| 2514 | Frege tried to explain synthetic a priori truths by expanding the concept of analyticity [Frege, by Katz] |
| Full Idea: Frege challenged synthetic a priori truths by expanding the concept of analyticity, undertaken in order to provide a semantic basis for his logicist explanation of mathematical truth as analytic truth. | |
| From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Jerrold J. Katz - Realistic Rationalism Int.xx |