Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Anaxarchus, Bertrand Russell and Ferdinand Tnnies

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these philosophers

display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers

---

8 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence

7554	Self-evidence is often a mere will-o'-the-wisp [Russell]
	Full Idea: Self-evidence is often a mere will-o'-the-wisp, which is sure to lead us astray if we take it as our guide.
	From: Bertrand Russell (Mathematics and the Metaphysicians [1901], p.78)
	A reaction: The sort of nice crisp remark you would expect from a good empiricist philosopher. Compare Idea 4948. However Russell qualifies it with the word 'often', and all philosophers eventually realise that you have to start somewhere.

5412	Some propositions are self-evident, but their implications may also be self-evident [Russell]
	Full Idea: When a certain number of logical principles have been admitted as self-evident, the rest can be deduced from them; but the propositions deduced are often just as self-evident as those that were assumed without proof.
	From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.11)
	A reaction: This seems an important corrective to the traditional rationalist dream, based on Euclid, that all knowledge is self-evident axioms followed by proofs of the rest. But Russell here endorses a more sensible sort of rationalism.

5413	Particular instances are more clearly self-evident than any general principles [Russell]
	Full Idea: Particular instances are more self-evident than general principles; for example, the law of contradiction is evident as soon as it is understood, but it is not as evident as that a particular rose cannot be both red and not red.
	From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.11)
	A reaction: This seems to true about nearly all reasoning, because whenever we are faced with a general principle for assessment, we check it by testing it against a series of particular instances, and try to think of contradictory particular counterexamples.

5415	As shown by memory, self-evidence comes in degrees [Russell]
	Full Idea: It is clear from the case of memory that self-evidence has degrees, and is present in gradations ranging from absolute certainty down to an almost imperceptible faintness.
	From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.11)
	A reaction: I am beginning to see Russell as the 'father of modern rationalism'. His relaxation of notions of an all-or-nothing a priori, and of a sharp distinction between axioms and proofs, lead to a sensible rationalism which even a Humean sceptic might buy.

5416	If self-evidence has degrees, we should accept the more self-evident as correct [Russell]
	Full Idea: If propositions can have some degree of self-evidence without being true, we must say, where there is a conflict, that the more self-evident proposition is to be retained and the less self-evident rejected.
	From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.11)
	A reaction: This is a key part of Russell's 'moderate rationalism'. Presumably the rejected propositions were therefore not self-evident, and can be used as training for intuitions, by seeing why we got it wrong. Fools find absurd falsehoods self-evidently true.

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities

5397	The rationalists were right, because we know logical principles without experience [Russell]
	Full Idea: In the most important point of the controversy between empiricists and rationalist, the rationalists were right, since logical principles are known to us, but cannot be proved by experience, since all proof presupposes them
	From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 7)
	A reaction: Russell initially presents this as the answer to 'innate ideas'. I would prefer to say, in the style of Descartes, that logic is self-evident to the natural light of reason. The debate isn't over. A Turing machine may be able to do logic.

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts

4430	All a priori knowledge deals with the relations of universals [Russell]
	Full Idea: All a priori knowledge deals with the relations of universals.
	From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.10)
	A reaction: A nice bold proposition, and remarkably Platonic for a famous empiricist. But then a priori knowledge of particulars sounds unlikely.

5411	We can know some general propositions by universals, when no instance can be given [Russell]
	Full Idea: The general proposition 'All products of two integers, which never have been and never will be thought of by any human being, are over 100' is undeniably true, and yet we can never give an instance of it; ..only a knowledge of the universals is required.
	From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.10)
	A reaction: A nice example which it seems to be impossible to contradict. But maybe we can explain our knowledge of it in terms of rules, instead of mentioning universals. Can a rule be stated without recourse to universals? Sounds unlikely.