display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
44 ideas
7554 | Self-evidence is often a mere will-o'-the-wisp [Russell] |
Full Idea: Self-evidence is often a mere will-o'-the-wisp, which is sure to lead us astray if we take it as our guide. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Mathematics and the Metaphysicians [1901], p.78) | |
A reaction: The sort of nice crisp remark you would expect from a good empiricist philosopher. Compare Idea 4948. However Russell qualifies it with the word 'often', and all philosophers eventually realise that you have to start somewhere. |
5412 | Some propositions are self-evident, but their implications may also be self-evident [Russell] |
Full Idea: When a certain number of logical principles have been admitted as self-evident, the rest can be deduced from them; but the propositions deduced are often just as self-evident as those that were assumed without proof. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: This seems an important corrective to the traditional rationalist dream, based on Euclid, that all knowledge is self-evident axioms followed by proofs of the rest. But Russell here endorses a more sensible sort of rationalism. |
5413 | Particular instances are more clearly self-evident than any general principles [Russell] |
Full Idea: Particular instances are more self-evident than general principles; for example, the law of contradiction is evident as soon as it is understood, but it is not as evident as that a particular rose cannot be both red and not red. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: This seems to true about nearly all reasoning, because whenever we are faced with a general principle for assessment, we check it by testing it against a series of particular instances, and try to think of contradictory particular counterexamples. |
5415 | As shown by memory, self-evidence comes in degrees [Russell] |
Full Idea: It is clear from the case of memory that self-evidence has degrees, and is present in gradations ranging from absolute certainty down to an almost imperceptible faintness. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: I am beginning to see Russell as the 'father of modern rationalism'. His relaxation of notions of an all-or-nothing a priori, and of a sharp distinction between axioms and proofs, lead to a sensible rationalism which even a Humean sceptic might buy. |
5416 | If self-evidence has degrees, we should accept the more self-evident as correct [Russell] |
Full Idea: If propositions can have some degree of self-evidence without being true, we must say, where there is a conflict, that the more self-evident proposition is to be retained and the less self-evident rejected. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: This is a key part of Russell's 'moderate rationalism'. Presumably the rejected propositions were therefore not self-evident, and can be used as training for intuitions, by seeing why we got it wrong. Fools find absurd falsehoods self-evidently true. |
5397 | The rationalists were right, because we know logical principles without experience [Russell] |
Full Idea: In the most important point of the controversy between empiricists and rationalist, the rationalists were right, since logical principles are known to us, but cannot be proved by experience, since all proof presupposes them | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: Russell initially presents this as the answer to 'innate ideas'. I would prefer to say, in the style of Descartes, that logic is self-evident to the natural light of reason. The debate isn't over. A Turing machine may be able to do logic. |
4430 | All a priori knowledge deals with the relations of universals [Russell] |
Full Idea: All a priori knowledge deals with the relations of universals. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: A nice bold proposition, and remarkably Platonic for a famous empiricist. But then a priori knowledge of particulars sounds unlikely. |
5411 | We can know some general propositions by universals, when no instance can be given [Russell] |
Full Idea: The general proposition 'All products of two integers, which never have been and never will be thought of by any human being, are over 100' is undeniably true, and yet we can never give an instance of it; ..only a knowledge of the universals is required. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: A nice example which it seems to be impossible to contradict. But maybe we can explain our knowledge of it in terms of rules, instead of mentioning universals. Can a rule be stated without recourse to universals? Sounds unlikely. |
6514 | Russell's representationalism says primary qualities only show the structure of reality [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: The weakest version of representationalism, found in Russell, asserts that there is no resemblance to reality on the level of secondary qualities, and also that primary qualities exhibit only a structural isomorphism. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912]) by Howard Robinson - Perception IX.2 | |
A reaction: This seems a plausible thing to say about, say, shape, but it is not clear how the idea works for hardness or mass. The sense of touch seems to be much more directly in contact with actual primary qualities than visions does (let alone smell or hearing). |
6415 | After 1912, Russell said sense-data are last in analysis, not first in experience [Russell, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: During the decade after 'Problems of Philosophy' Russell points our repeatedly that specifications of sense-data come last in analysis, not first in experience. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This was a symptom of Russell losing faith in sense-data, and he eventually abandoned them. There is a possible position where we deny any such item as sense-data in a scientific account, but allow them in our metaphysics. |
5358 | 'Sense-data' are what are immediately known in sensation, such as colours or roughnesses [Russell] |
Full Idea: Let us give the name 'sense-data' to the things that are immediately known in sensation: such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses, and so on. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 1) | |
A reaction: This idea gradually became notorious, because it seems to create a new ontological category unnecessarily, and it creates problems, such as how the intermediary interacts with us and with things. Are sense-data totally non-conceptual? |
6417 | In 1921 Russell abandoned sense-data, and the gap between sensation and object [Russell, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: In 'The Analysis of Mind' Russell gave up talk of 'sense-data', and ceased to distinguish between the act of sensing and what is sensed. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This seems to lead towards the modern 'adverbial' account of sensing, where I don't sense 'data', but where qualia (such as redness) are our particular mode of directly perceiving objects, where insects might directly perceive them in a different mode. |
6474 | Seeing is not in itself knowledge, but is separate from what is seen, such as a patch of colour [Russell] |
Full Idea: Undeniably, knowledge comes through seeing, but it is a mistake to regard the mere seeing itself as knowledge; if we are so to regard it, we must distinguish the seeing from what is seen; a patch of colour is one thing, and our seeing it is another. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921], Lec. VIII) | |
A reaction: This is Russell's 1921 explanation of why he adopted sense-data (but he rejects them later in this paragraph). This gives a simplistic impression of what he intended, which has three components: the object, the 'sensibile', and the sense-datum. |
6483 | Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914]) by Howard Robinson - Perception 1.1 | |
A reaction: I can't say that I had ever intepreted Russell in this way, but it is a wonderfully thought-provoking idea. All the time that I thought I was looking at a table, I was just looking at my own brain, and drawing an unspoken inference that a table caused it. |
8244 | Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: Rather than oppose sensory knowledge and scientific knowledge, we should identify the sensibilia that are peculiar to science. This is what Russell did when he evoked sense-data, qualities devoid of all subjectivity. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914]) by G Deleuze / F Guattari - What is Philosophy? 2.5 | |
A reaction: An interesting observation. Russell is striking for his lack of interest in theories of arts and ethics, and his whole work focuses on understanding the scientific view. What is involved in sensibilia is a key modern issue (e.g. McDowell). |
6462 | Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell] |
Full Idea: I regard sense-data as not mental, and as being, in fact, part of the actual subject-matter of physics. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §III) | |
A reaction: Russell had clearly given himself an ontological problem with the introduction of sense-data, and this is his drastic solution. In 1912 his account seems ambiguous between sense-data being mental and being physical. |
6463 | Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell] |
Full Idea: Logically a sense-datum is an object, a particular of which the subject is aware; it does not contain the subject as a part, as for example beliefs and volitions do. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §IV) | |
A reaction: This very firmly rejects any notion that a sense-datum is mental. It is a left as a strange sort of object which gets as close as it is possible to get to the 'borders' of the mind, without actually becoming part of it. |
6464 | Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell] |
Full Idea: The sense-datum is an external object of which in sensation the subject is aware; it is true that the sense-datum is in many cases in the subject's body, but the subject's body is as distinct from the subject as tables and chairs are. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §IV) | |
A reaction: This is probably Russell's clearest statement of the nature of sense-data, which are objects within the subjects body, but are not part of the mind. So once again we come up against the question of their ontology. Are they made of neurons? |
7549 | If my body literally lost its mind, the object seen when I see a flash would still exist [Russell] |
Full Idea: My meaning may be made plainer by saying that if my body could remain in exactly the same state in which it is, though my mind had ceased to exist, precisely that object which I now see when I see a flash would exist, though I should not see it. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Ultimate Constituents of Matter [1915], p.126) | |
A reaction: Zombies, 70 years before Robert Kirk! Sense-data are physical. It is interesting to see a philosopher as committed to empiricism, anti-spiritualism and the priority of science as this, still presenting an essentially dualist picture of perception. |
6467 | No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell] |
Full Idea: No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §VII) | |
A reaction: So a loud bang has to broken down into an almost infinite number of sound sensibilia - each one presumably the size of the apperture of a small ear. This is beginning to sound a bit silly. |
7553 | Sense-data are purely physical [Russell] |
Full Idea: Sense-data are purely physical, and all that is mental in connection with them is our awareness of them. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Ultimate Constituents of Matter [1915], p.138) | |
A reaction: Once this account of sense-data becomes fully clear, it also becomes apparent what a dualist theory it is. The mind is a cinema, I am the audience, and sense-data are the screen. There has to be a big logical gap between viewer and screen. |
6459 | We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data [Russell] |
Full Idea: We do not know, except by means of more or less precarious inferences, whether the objects which are at one time sense-data continue to exist at times when they are not data. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §II) | |
A reaction: Note that he actually refers to sense-data as 'objects'. It shows how thoroughly reified they are in his theory if they have the possibility of independent existence. This invites the question 'what are they made of?' |
6460 | 'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind [Russell] |
Full Idea: I shall give the name 'sensibilia' to those objects which have the same metaphysical and physical status as sense-data without necessarily being data to any mind. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §III) | |
A reaction: This is his response to the problem of whether sense-data can exist independently of experience, which was unclear in 1912. Presumably sensibilia are objects which are possible sources of experience, but that seems to cover most objects. |
6461 | Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands [Russell] |
Full Idea: We cannot ask, 'Can sense-data exist without being given?' for that is like asking, 'Can husbands exist without being married?' | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §III) | |
A reaction: This follows hard on Idea 6460, which introduces the idea of 'sensibilia' for things which are like sense-data, but are not 'given'. This is a new distinction in 1914, which he had not made in 1912. |
21583 | When sense-data change, there must be indistinguishable sense-data in the process [Russell] |
Full Idea: In all cases of sense-data capable of gradual change, we may find one sense-datum indistinguishable from another, and that indistinguishable from a third, while yet the first and third are quite easily distinguishable. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], 5) | |
A reaction: This point is key to the sense-data theory, because it gives them independent existence, standing between reality and subjective experience. It is also the reason why they look increasingly implausible, if they may not be experienced. |
8854 | My 'acquaintance' with sense-data is nothing like my knowing New York [Williams,M on Russell] |
Full Idea: My 'acquaintance' with sense-data is nothing like my knowing New York. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Knowledge by Acquaintance and Description-1 [1911]) by Michael Williams - Without Immediate Justification §4 | |
A reaction: This pinpoints a nice difficulty for Russell. Williams may misrepresent Russell's account of acquaintance, but that is probably because Russell is unclear, or uncertain. The problem is when Russell claims that his acquaintance gives knowledge. |
6458 | Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell] |
Full Idea: There is some difficulty in deciding what is to be considered one sense-datum: often attention causes divisions to appear where, so far as can be discovered, there were no divisions before. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §II) | |
A reaction: This was, I suspect, why Russell had dropped the idea of sense-data by 1921. He does, however, say that they are the last unit in analysis, rather than being the most basic unit of perception. In other words, they are purely theoretical. |
6469 | Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell] |
Full Idea: One reason often alleged for the subjectivity of sense-data is that the appearance of a thing itself may change when we find it hard to suppose that the thing itself has changed - as when we shut our eyes, or screw them up to make things look double. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §VIII) | |
A reaction: Russell firmly denies that they are subjective. These examples are also said to support to proposed existence of sense-data in the first place, since they show the gap between appearance and reality. |
6476 | We cannot assume that the subject actually exists, so we cannot distinguish sensations from sense-data [Russell] |
Full Idea: If we are to avoid a perfectly gratuitous assumption, we must dispense with the subject as one of the actual ingredients of the world; but when we do this, the possibility of distinguishing the sensation from the sense-datum vanishes. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921], Lec. VIII) | |
A reaction: This is the reason why Russell himself rejected sense-data. It is more normal, I think, to reject them simply as being superfluous. If the subject can simply perceive the sense-data, why can't they just perceive the object more directly? |
6098 | Perception goes straight to the fact, and not through the proposition [Russell] |
Full Idea: I am inclined to think that perception, as opposed to belief, does go straight to the fact and not through the proposition. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §IV.4) | |
A reaction: There seems to be a question of an intermediate stage, which is the formulation of concepts. Is full 'perception' (backed by attention and intellect) laden with concepts, which point to facts? Where are the facts in sensation without recognition? |
21577 | Empirical truths are particular, so general truths need an a priori input of generality [Russell] |
Full Idea: All empirical evidence is of particular truths. Hence, if there is any knowledge of general truths at all, there must be some knowledge of general truths which is independent of empirical evidence. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], 2) | |
A reaction: Humean empiricists respond by being a sceptical of general truths. At this stage of his career Russell looks like a thoroughgoing rationalist, and he believes in the reality of universals, relations and propositions. He became more empirical later. |
7290 | If Russell rejects innate ideas and direct a priori knowledge, he is left with a tabula rasa [Russell, by Thompson] |
Full Idea: If Russell rejects innate ideas, and he even thinks the laws of thought must by triggered by experiences (e.g. of a beech tree), and he doesn't embrace associations, this implies that he thinks the mind begins as a tabula rasa. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912]) by George Thompson - talk | |
A reaction: This nice observation places Russell as (in my view) a rather old-fashioned empiricist, who ignores Hume and Kant, and is not willing to speculate about how the mind can turn acquaintances with sense-data into knowledge |
5357 | It is natural to begin from experience, and presumably that is the basis of knowledge [Russell] |
Full Idea: In the search for certainty, it is natural to begin with our present experiences, and in some sense, no doubt, knowledge is to be derived from them. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 1) | |
A reaction: Is experience the 'natural' place to begin? It didn't seem to strike Descartes that way. It seems better to say that philosophy begins when we are not quite satisfied with experience, and the natural place to begin is 'dissatisfaction'. |
5382 | We are acquainted with outer and inner sensation, memory, Self, and universals [Russell, by PG] |
Full Idea: We have acquaintance with outer senses, with inner sense (by introspection), with memory (of outer or inner sensations), with a Self (probably), and also with universals (general ideas). | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: The spectacular odd one out in a basic empiricist theory is, of course, universals, when one expects some sort of nominalist reduction of those into sense-data. I am very sympathetic to the Russell line, though it spells big ontological trouble. |
16476 | For simple words, a single experience can show that they are true [Russell] |
Full Idea: So long as a man avoids words which are condensed inductions (such as 'dog'), and confines himself to words that can describe a single experience, it is possible for a single experience to show that his words are true. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: One might question whether a line can be drawn between the inductive and the non-inductive in this way. I'm inclined just to say that the simpler the proposition the less room there is for error in confirming it. |
5389 | Knowledge by descriptions enables us to transcend private experience [Russell] |
Full Idea: The chief importance of knowledge by descriptions is that it enables us to pass beyond the limits of our private experience. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 5) | |
A reaction: The most basic question for empiricism concerns how we can know things beyond immediate experience. Russell is right, though this doesn't tell us much. We need to know the rules for valid descriptions, explanation, speculations etc. |
6441 | Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell] |
Full Idea: Pragmatism holds that a belief is to be judged if it has certain effects, whereas I hold that an empirical belief is to be judged true if it has certain kinds of causes. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.15) | |
A reaction: I'm with Russell here, and this seems to me a convincing objection to pragmatism. The simple problem is that falsehoods can occasionally have very beneficial effects. Beliefs are made true by the facts, not by their consequences. |
21532 | Full empiricism is not tenable, but empirical investigation is always essential [Russell] |
Full Idea: Although empiricism as a philosophy does not appear to be tenable, there is an empirical manner of investigating, which should be applied in every subject-matter | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Meinong on Complexes and Assumptions [1904], p.22) | |
A reaction: Given that early Russell loads his ontology with properties and propositions, this should come as no surprise, even if J.S. Mill was his godfather. |
5376 | I can know the existence of something with which nobody is acquainted [Russell] |
Full Idea: There is no reason why I should not know of the existence of something with which nobody is acquainted. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: This sort of realist claim (which he goes on to say results from inferences from descriptions) is needed to save empiricism from the absurdities of Berkeley and (dare I say it?) Quine. The Kantian Ego is a candidate. |
16485 | Perception can't prove universal generalisations, so abandon them, or abandon empiricism? [Russell] |
Full Idea: Propositions about 'some' may be proved empirically, but propositions about 'all' are difficult to know, and can't be proved unless such propositions are in the premisses. These aren't in perception, so forgo general propositions, or abandon empiricism? | |
From: Bertrand Russell (An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth [1940], 5) | |
A reaction: This is obviously related to the difficulty empiricists have with induction. You could hardly persuade logicians to give up the universal quantifier, because it is needed in mathematics. Do we actually know any universal empirical truths? |
16488 | It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell] |
Full Idea: If 'it is not raining' means 'the sentence "it is raining" is false', that makes it almost impossible to understand how a sentence containing the word 'not' can be found true by observation. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Human Knowledge: its scope and limits [1948], 9) | |
A reaction: Russell goes on to explore the general difficulty of deciding negative truths by observation. The same problem arises for truthmaker theory. Obviously I can observe that it isn't raining, but it seems parasitic on observing when it is raining. |
6431 | Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell] |
Full Idea: When I began to think about theory of knowledge, I found that none of the philosophers who emphasise 'experience' tells us what they mean by the word. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: A very significant comment about empiricism. Hume does not seem very clear about what an 'impression' is. Russell's problem has been dealt with intensively by modern empiricists, who discuss 'the given', and conceptualised perception. |
5414 | Images are not memory, because they are present, and memories are of the past [Russell] |
Full Idea: An image cannot constitute a memory, because we notice that the image is in the present, whereas what is remembered is known to be in the past. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.11) | |
A reaction: This sounds a bit glib, and maybe makes the mistake for which he criticises Berkeley, of confusing a thought and its content. The puzzle is how we know that some images represent the past, others the present, others predictions, and others fantasy. |
2792 | It is possible the world came into existence five minutes ago, complete with false memories [Russell] |
Full Idea: There is no logical impossibility in the hypothesis that the world sprang into being five minutes ago, exactly as it then was, with a population that "remembered" a wholly unreal past. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921], p.159) | |
A reaction: One of the great sceptical arguments! At a stroke it undermines forever any dreams that memories are totally certain. This is an extra scepticism, which arises if you decide that current experience IS totally certain. |