display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
4 ideas
6490 | For Descartes, objects have one primary quality, which is geometrical [Descartes, by Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: Descartes denies any similarity between the physical world and ideas, as matter possesses only geometrical properties; Locke allows more primary qualities, but follows Boyle and the atomists in treating secondary qualities as creations of sense. | |
From: report of René Descartes (Meditations [1641]) by Howard Robinson - Perception 1.5 | |
A reaction: The interesting point to note here is that Descartes' geometrical view of objects (they are defined purely by 'extension') is the view that they have one minimal primary quality. I prefer Locke's view, of which the history (given here) is interesting. |
22593 | Our sensation of light may not be the same as what produces the sensation [Descartes] |
Full Idea: There can be a difference between our sensation of light and what is in the objects that produce that sensation in us. | |
From: René Descartes (The World [1631]), quoted by Ian Dunt - How to be a Liberal 1 | |
A reaction: Note only that they 'may' differ, and that he does not assert that they are entirely different. Secondary qualities give information, and are not just mental events. |
7400 | Descartes said images can refer to objects without resembling them (as words do) [Descartes, by Tuck] |
Full Idea: Descartes argued (in 'The World') that just as words refer to objects, but they do not resemble them, in the same way, visual images or other sensory inputs relate to objects without depicting them. | |
From: report of René Descartes (works [1643]) by Richard Tuck - Hobbes | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a rather significant and plausible claim, which might contain the germ of the idea of a language of thought. It is also the basis for the recent view that language is the best route to understanding the mind. |
2295 | Why does pain make us sad? [Descartes] |
Full Idea: Why should a certain sadness of spirit arise from a sensation of pain? | |
From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §6.76) |