display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
5 ideas
7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
Full Idea: All the primary qualities lend themselves readily to mathematical or geometric description. ...but it seems that secondary qualities are less amenable to being represented mathematically. | |
From: Cardinal/Hayward/Jones (Epistemology [2004], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: As a believer in the primary/secondary distinction, I welcome this point. This is either evidence for the external reality of primary qualities, or an interesting observation about maths. Do we make the primary/secondary distinction because we do maths? |
7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
Full Idea: An object cannot lack shape, size, position or motion and remain an object. | |
From: Cardinal/Hayward/Jones (Epistemology [2004], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This points towards the essentialist view (see Idea 5453). This does raise the question of whether an object could lose its colour with impugnity, or the quality of sound that it makes when struck. |
7639 | The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally [Evans] |
Full Idea: The 'homunculus fallacy' attempts to explain what is involved in a subject's being related to objects in the external world by appealing to the existence of an inner situation which recapitulates the essential features of the original situation. | |
From: Gareth Evans (Molyneux's Question [1978], p.397) | |
A reaction: This is obviously right, but we aren't forced to settle for direct realism. Inner perception may be very different, or we may employ the idea of Dennett and Lycan, that the homunculi don't regress, they deteriorate steadily down into mechanisms. |
12580 | Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco] |
Full Idea: In Evans's work experiences are conceived of as not having a conceptual content at all. | |
From: report of Gareth Evans (The Varieties of Reference [1980]) by John Greco - Justification is not Internal | |
A reaction: I presume it is this view which provoked McDowell's contrary view in 'Mind and World'. I say this is a job for neuroscience, and I struggle to see what philosophical questions hang on the outcome. I think I side with Evans. |
7643 | We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans] |
Full Idea: Do we really understand the proposal that we have as many colour concepts as there are shades colour that we can sensibly discriminate? | |
From: Gareth Evans (The Varieties of Reference [1980], 7.5) | |
A reaction: This is the argument (rejected by McDowell) that experience cannot be conceptual because experience is too rich. We should not confuse lack of concepts with lack of words. I may have a concept of a colour between two shades, but no word for it. |