display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
11 ideas
| 9158 | For Frege a priori knowledge derives from general principles, so numbers can't be primitive [Frege] |
| Full Idea: If one took the numbers as primitive, one would not be deriving their existence and character from general principles- thus controverting Frege's view of the nature of an a priori subject. | |
| From: Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]), quoted by Tyler Burge - Frege on Apriority II | |
| A reaction: He seems to be in tune with Leibniz on this. His view begs the obvious question of where the general principles come from. I would have thought that relationships between concepts might be known a priori, without principles being involved. |
| 16887 | Frege's concept of 'self-evident' makes no reference to minds [Frege, by Burge] |
| Full Idea: Frege's terms that translate 'self-evident' usually make no explicit reference to actual minds. | |
| From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Tyler Burge - Frege on Knowing the Foundations 4 | |
| A reaction: This follows the distinction in Aquinas, between things that are intrinsically self-evident, and things that are self-evident to particular people. God, presumably, knows all of the former. |
| 8657 | Mathematicians just accept self-evidence, whether it is logical or intuitive [Frege] |
| Full Idea: The mathematician rests content if every transition to a fresh judgement is self-evidently correct, without enquiring into the nature of this self-evidence, whether it is logical or intuitive. | |
| From: Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §90) | |
| A reaction: Note the suggestion that there are two different sorts of self-evidence. But see Idea 1410. Frege presumably drifted into philosophy because he wasn't happy with this blissful ignorance. |
| 16894 | An apriori truth is grounded in generality, which is universal quantification [Frege, by Burge] |
| Full Idea: Generality for Frege is simply universal quantification; what makes a truth apriori is that its ultimate grounds are universally quantified. | |
| From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Tyler Burge - Frege on Apriority (with ps) 2 |
| 9352 | An a priori truth is one derived from general laws which do not require proof [Frege] |
| Full Idea: If the proof of a truth can be derived exclusively from general laws, which themselves neither need nor admit of proof, then the truth is a priori. | |
| From: Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §03) | |
| A reaction: Presumably the unproved general laws from which the derivation comes are more securely a priori, as are the principles used to make the derivation. As Frege says, he is trying to spell out Kant's view; see Idea 9345. |
| 16889 | A truth is a priori if it can be proved entirely from general unproven laws [Frege] |
| Full Idea: If it is possible to derive a proof purely from general laws, which themselves neither need nor admit of proof, then the truth is a priori. | |
| From: Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §03), quoted by Tyler Burge - Frege on Apriority (with ps) 1 | |
| A reaction: Burge brings out the contrast with Kant, for whom a priori truths are derived from particular facts, not general ones. |
| 2514 | Frege tried to explain synthetic a priori truths by expanding the concept of analyticity [Frege, by Katz] |
| Full Idea: Frege challenged synthetic a priori truths by expanding the concept of analyticity, undertaken in order to provide a semantic basis for his logicist explanation of mathematical truth as analytic truth. | |
| From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Jerrold J. Katz - Realistic Rationalism Int.xx |
| 8252 | Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell] |
| Full Idea: Davidson thinks that experience can be nothing but an extra-conceptual impact on sensibility. So he concludes that experience must be outside the space of reasons. | |
| From: report of Donald Davidson (Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge [1983], I.6) by John McDowell - Mind and World I | |
| A reaction: McDowell's challenge to the view that experience is extra-conceptual seems to be the key debate among modern empiricists. My only intuition in this area is that we should beware of all-or-nothing solutions to such problems. |
| 6400 | Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: The third dogma of empiricism is the dualism of scheme and content, of organizing system and something waiting to be organized, which cannot be made intelligible and defensible. If we give it up, it is not clear that any distinctive empiricism remains. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme [1974], p.189) | |
| A reaction: The first two dogmas were 'analyticity' and 'reductionism', as identified by Quine in 1953. Presumably Hume's Principles of Association (Idea 2189) would be an example of a scheme. A key issue is whether there is any 'pure' content. |
| 8255 | Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson] |
| Full Idea: Davidson urges that we should hold that the world exerts a merely causal influence on our thinking, but I am trying to describe a way in which the world exerts a rational influence on our thinking. | |
| From: comment on Donald Davidson (Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge [1983]) by John McDowell - Mind and World II.5 | |
| A reaction: McDowell seems to be fighting for the existence of 'pure' reason in a way that is hard to defend with a thoroughly materialist view of human brains. If the world is coherent, then maybe it is rational, and so has reasons to offer us? |
| 16900 | Intuitions cannot be communicated [Frege, by Burge] |
| Full Idea: Frege makes a notorious claim that what is intuitable is not communicable. | |
| From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §26) by Tyler Burge - Frege on Apriority (with ps) 4 |