display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
4 ideas
2788 | If perception and memory are indirect, then two things stand between mind and reality [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: If perception is indirect as well as memory, this means there are two direct objects of awareness between the remembering mind and the original object. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 12.2) |
2787 | Memories aren't directly about the past, because time-lags and illusions suggest representation [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Direct realism about memory believes the memory is the past. But the time-lag argument and various illusions are powerful here, suggesting indirect realism involving a memory image. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 12.2) |
2791 | Phenomenalism about memory denies the past, or reduces it to present experience [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Eliminative phenomenalism about memory holds that there is no such thing as the past, just certain present experiences; reductive phenomenalism holds that there is a past, but it is no more than a complex of those present experiences. | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 12.4) |
2790 | I can remember plans about the future, and images aren't essential (2+3=5) [Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Memory is not solely concerned with the past, let alone one's own past (I remember that I must be in London next week), and need not involve images (2+2=4). | |
From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 12.3) | |
A reaction: I can hardly remember the future, so I presume I am remembering my past commitment to go to London, even if I visualise the future with me in London. The non-necessity of images seems right. I can remember the Mona Lisa without a precise image. |