display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
13 ideas
| 17711 | Our minds take on the form of what is being perceived [Aristotle, by Mares] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle famously holds that in perception our minds take on the form of what is being perceived. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE]) by Edwin D. Mares - A Priori 08.2 | |
| A reaction: [References in Aristotle needed here...] |
| 1725 | Why can't we sense the senses? And why do senses need stimuli? [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Why is there not also a sense of the senses themselves? And why don't the senses produce sensation without external bodies, since they contain elements? | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 417a03) |
| 1732 | Sense organs aren't the end of sensation, or they would know what does the sensing [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Flesh is not the ultimate sense-organ. To suppose that it is requires the supposition that on contact with the object the sense-organ itself discerns what is doing the discerning. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 426b16) |
| 12379 | You cannot understand anything through perception [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: You cannot understand anything through perception. Demonstrations are universal, and universals cannot be perceived. | |
| From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 87b28) |
| 16723 | Perception of sensible objects is virtually never wrong [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Perception of the special objects of sense is never in error or admits the least possible amount of falsehood. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 428b19) | |
| A reaction: This is, surprisingly, the view which was raised and largely rejected in 'Theaetetus'. It became a doctrine of Epicureanism, and seems to make Aristotle a thoroughgoing empiricist, though that is not so clear elsewhere. I think Aristotle is right. |
| 1724 | Perception necessitates pleasure and pain, which necessitates appetite [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Where there is perception there is also pleasure and pain, and where there are these, of necessity also appetite. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 413b23) |
| 1730 | Why do we have many senses, and not just one? [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A possible line of inquiry would be into the question for what purpose we have many senses and not just one. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 425b04) |
| 16717 | Which of the contrary features of a body are basic to it? [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: What sorts of contrarities, and how many of them, are to be accounted 'originative sources' of body? | |
| From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 329b04) | |
| A reaction: Pasnau says these pages of Aristotle are the source of the doctrine of primary and secondary qualities. Essentially, hot, cold, wet and dry are his four primary qualities. |
| 1728 | Many objects of sensation are common to all the senses [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Common sense-objects are movement, rest, number, shape and size, which are not special to any one sense, but common to all. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 418a18) |
| 1727 | Some objects of sensation are unique to one sense, where deception is impossible [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Now I call that sense-object 'special' that does not admit of being perceived by another sense and about which it is impossible to be deceived. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 418a15) |
| 16725 | Some knowledge is lost if you lose a sense, and there is no way the knowledge can be replaced [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The loss of any one of the senses entails the loss of a corresponding portion of knowledge, and since we learn either by induction or by demonstration, this knowledge cannot be acquired. | |
| From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 81a37) | |
| A reaction: This suggests Jackson's 'knowledge argument', that raw experience contains some genuine knowledge, for which there is no mechanistic substitute. Not that I accept…. |
| 1734 | In moral thought images are essential, to be pursued or avoided [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In the thinking soul, images play the part of percepts, and the assertion or negation of good or bad is invariably accompanied by avoidance or pursuit, which is the reason for the soul's never thinking without an image. | |
| From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 431a15) |
| 5220 | Particular facts (such as 'is it cooked?') are matters of sense-perception, not deliberation [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Deliberation is not concerned with particular facts, such as 'is it a loaf?' or 'is it properly cooked?'; these are matters of sense-perception. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1112b33) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be Aristotle's commitment to direct cognition through perception, though if pressed he might concede that concepts (such as 'cooked') are involved in perception. |