display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
4 ideas
16718 | Primary qualities are the cause of all the other sensible qualities [Albertus Magnus] |
Full Idea: The primary qualities of tangible things are the cause of all the other sensible qualities. | |
From: Albertus Magnus (On 'Generation and Corruption' [1261], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 21.2 | |
A reaction: This makes the primary qualities sound suspiciously like the essence. |
8128 | Representation must be propositional if it can give reasons and be epistemological [McDowell, by Burge] |
Full Idea: McDowell has claimed that one cannot make sense of representation that plays a role in epistemology unless one takes the representation to be propositional, and thus capable of yielding reasons. | |
From: report of John McDowell (Mind and World [1994]) by Tyler Burge - Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 p.456 | |
A reaction: A transcendental argument leads back to a somewhat implausible conclusion. I suspect that McDowell has a slightly inflated (Kantian) notion of the purity of the 'space of reasons'. Do philosophers just imagine their problems? |
19092 | There is no pure Given, but it is cultured, rather than entirely relative [McDowell, by Macbeth] |
Full Idea: McDowell argues that the Myth of the Given shows not that there is no content to a concept that is not a matter of its inferential relations to other concepts but only that awareness of the sort that we enjoy ...is acquired in the course of acculturation. | |
From: report of John McDowell (Mind and World [1994]) by Danielle Macbeth - Pragmatism and Objective Truth p.185 | |
A reaction: The first view is of Wilfred Sellars, who derives pragmatic relativism from his rejection of the Myth. This idea is helpful is seeing why McDowell has a good proposal. As I look out of my window, my immediate experience seems 'cultured'. |
8253 | Sense impressions already have conceptual content [McDowell] |
Full Idea: The world's impressions on our senses are already possessed of conceptual content. | |
From: John McDowell (Mind and World [1994], I.6) | |
A reaction: This is a key idea of McDowell's, which challenges most traditional empiricist views, and (maybe) offers a solution to the rationalist/empiricist debate. His commitment to the 'space of reasons' strikes me as an optional extra. |