display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
23 ideas
6514 | Russell's representationalism says primary qualities only show the structure of reality [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: The weakest version of representationalism, found in Russell, asserts that there is no resemblance to reality on the level of secondary qualities, and also that primary qualities exhibit only a structural isomorphism. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912]) by Howard Robinson - Perception IX.2 | |
A reaction: This seems a plausible thing to say about, say, shape, but it is not clear how the idea works for hardness or mass. The sense of touch seems to be much more directly in contact with actual primary qualities than visions does (let alone smell or hearing). |
6415 | After 1912, Russell said sense-data are last in analysis, not first in experience [Russell, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: During the decade after 'Problems of Philosophy' Russell points our repeatedly that specifications of sense-data come last in analysis, not first in experience. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This was a symptom of Russell losing faith in sense-data, and he eventually abandoned them. There is a possible position where we deny any such item as sense-data in a scientific account, but allow them in our metaphysics. |
5358 | 'Sense-data' are what are immediately known in sensation, such as colours or roughnesses [Russell] |
Full Idea: Let us give the name 'sense-data' to the things that are immediately known in sensation: such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses, and so on. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 1) | |
A reaction: This idea gradually became notorious, because it seems to create a new ontological category unnecessarily, and it creates problems, such as how the intermediary interacts with us and with things. Are sense-data totally non-conceptual? |
6417 | In 1921 Russell abandoned sense-data, and the gap between sensation and object [Russell, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: In 'The Analysis of Mind' Russell gave up talk of 'sense-data', and ceased to distinguish between the act of sensing and what is sensed. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This seems to lead towards the modern 'adverbial' account of sensing, where I don't sense 'data', but where qualia (such as redness) are our particular mode of directly perceiving objects, where insects might directly perceive them in a different mode. |
6474 | Seeing is not in itself knowledge, but is separate from what is seen, such as a patch of colour [Russell] |
Full Idea: Undeniably, knowledge comes through seeing, but it is a mistake to regard the mere seeing itself as knowledge; if we are so to regard it, we must distinguish the seeing from what is seen; a patch of colour is one thing, and our seeing it is another. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921], Lec. VIII) | |
A reaction: This is Russell's 1921 explanation of why he adopted sense-data (but he rejects them later in this paragraph). This gives a simplistic impression of what he intended, which has three components: the object, the 'sensibile', and the sense-datum. |
6456 | Sense-data are neutral uninterpreted experiences, separated from objects and judgements [Angeles] |
Full Idea: Sense-data are that which is given to us directly and immediately such as colour, shape, smell, without identification of them as specific material objects; they are usually thought to be devoid of judgment, interpretation, bias, preconception. | |
From: Peter A. Angeles (A Dictionary of Philosophy [1981], p.254) | |
A reaction: This definition makes them clearly mental (rather than being qualities of objects), and they sound like Hume's 'impressions'. They are not features of the external world, but the first steps we make towards experience. |
6483 | Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914]) by Howard Robinson - Perception 1.1 | |
A reaction: I can't say that I had ever intepreted Russell in this way, but it is a wonderfully thought-provoking idea. All the time that I thought I was looking at a table, I was just looking at my own brain, and drawing an unspoken inference that a table caused it. |
8244 | Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: Rather than oppose sensory knowledge and scientific knowledge, we should identify the sensibilia that are peculiar to science. This is what Russell did when he evoked sense-data, qualities devoid of all subjectivity. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914]) by G Deleuze / F Guattari - What is Philosophy? 2.5 | |
A reaction: An interesting observation. Russell is striking for his lack of interest in theories of arts and ethics, and his whole work focuses on understanding the scientific view. What is involved in sensibilia is a key modern issue (e.g. McDowell). |
6462 | Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell] |
Full Idea: I regard sense-data as not mental, and as being, in fact, part of the actual subject-matter of physics. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §III) | |
A reaction: Russell had clearly given himself an ontological problem with the introduction of sense-data, and this is his drastic solution. In 1912 his account seems ambiguous between sense-data being mental and being physical. |
6463 | Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell] |
Full Idea: Logically a sense-datum is an object, a particular of which the subject is aware; it does not contain the subject as a part, as for example beliefs and volitions do. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §IV) | |
A reaction: This very firmly rejects any notion that a sense-datum is mental. It is a left as a strange sort of object which gets as close as it is possible to get to the 'borders' of the mind, without actually becoming part of it. |
6464 | Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell] |
Full Idea: The sense-datum is an external object of which in sensation the subject is aware; it is true that the sense-datum is in many cases in the subject's body, but the subject's body is as distinct from the subject as tables and chairs are. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §IV) | |
A reaction: This is probably Russell's clearest statement of the nature of sense-data, which are objects within the subjects body, but are not part of the mind. So once again we come up against the question of their ontology. Are they made of neurons? |
7549 | If my body literally lost its mind, the object seen when I see a flash would still exist [Russell] |
Full Idea: My meaning may be made plainer by saying that if my body could remain in exactly the same state in which it is, though my mind had ceased to exist, precisely that object which I now see when I see a flash would exist, though I should not see it. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Ultimate Constituents of Matter [1915], p.126) | |
A reaction: Zombies, 70 years before Robert Kirk! Sense-data are physical. It is interesting to see a philosopher as committed to empiricism, anti-spiritualism and the priority of science as this, still presenting an essentially dualist picture of perception. |
6467 | No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell] |
Full Idea: No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §VII) | |
A reaction: So a loud bang has to broken down into an almost infinite number of sound sensibilia - each one presumably the size of the apperture of a small ear. This is beginning to sound a bit silly. |
7553 | Sense-data are purely physical [Russell] |
Full Idea: Sense-data are purely physical, and all that is mental in connection with them is our awareness of them. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Ultimate Constituents of Matter [1915], p.138) | |
A reaction: Once this account of sense-data becomes fully clear, it also becomes apparent what a dualist theory it is. The mind is a cinema, I am the audience, and sense-data are the screen. There has to be a big logical gap between viewer and screen. |
6459 | We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data [Russell] |
Full Idea: We do not know, except by means of more or less precarious inferences, whether the objects which are at one time sense-data continue to exist at times when they are not data. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §II) | |
A reaction: Note that he actually refers to sense-data as 'objects'. It shows how thoroughly reified they are in his theory if they have the possibility of independent existence. This invites the question 'what are they made of?' |
6460 | 'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind [Russell] |
Full Idea: I shall give the name 'sensibilia' to those objects which have the same metaphysical and physical status as sense-data without necessarily being data to any mind. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §III) | |
A reaction: This is his response to the problem of whether sense-data can exist independently of experience, which was unclear in 1912. Presumably sensibilia are objects which are possible sources of experience, but that seems to cover most objects. |
6461 | Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands [Russell] |
Full Idea: We cannot ask, 'Can sense-data exist without being given?' for that is like asking, 'Can husbands exist without being married?' | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §III) | |
A reaction: This follows hard on Idea 6460, which introduces the idea of 'sensibilia' for things which are like sense-data, but are not 'given'. This is a new distinction in 1914, which he had not made in 1912. |
21583 | When sense-data change, there must be indistinguishable sense-data in the process [Russell] |
Full Idea: In all cases of sense-data capable of gradual change, we may find one sense-datum indistinguishable from another, and that indistinguishable from a third, while yet the first and third are quite easily distinguishable. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], 5) | |
A reaction: This point is key to the sense-data theory, because it gives them independent existence, standing between reality and subjective experience. It is also the reason why they look increasingly implausible, if they may not be experienced. |
8854 | My 'acquaintance' with sense-data is nothing like my knowing New York [Williams,M on Russell] |
Full Idea: My 'acquaintance' with sense-data is nothing like my knowing New York. | |
From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Knowledge by Acquaintance and Description-1 [1911]) by Michael Williams - Without Immediate Justification §4 | |
A reaction: This pinpoints a nice difficulty for Russell. Williams may misrepresent Russell's account of acquaintance, but that is probably because Russell is unclear, or uncertain. The problem is when Russell claims that his acquaintance gives knowledge. |
6458 | Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell] |
Full Idea: There is some difficulty in deciding what is to be considered one sense-datum: often attention causes divisions to appear where, so far as can be discovered, there were no divisions before. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §II) | |
A reaction: This was, I suspect, why Russell had dropped the idea of sense-data by 1921. He does, however, say that they are the last unit in analysis, rather than being the most basic unit of perception. In other words, they are purely theoretical. |
6469 | Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell] |
Full Idea: One reason often alleged for the subjectivity of sense-data is that the appearance of a thing itself may change when we find it hard to suppose that the thing itself has changed - as when we shut our eyes, or screw them up to make things look double. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914], §VIII) | |
A reaction: Russell firmly denies that they are subjective. These examples are also said to support to proposed existence of sense-data in the first place, since they show the gap between appearance and reality. |
6476 | We cannot assume that the subject actually exists, so we cannot distinguish sensations from sense-data [Russell] |
Full Idea: If we are to avoid a perfectly gratuitous assumption, we must dispense with the subject as one of the actual ingredients of the world; but when we do this, the possibility of distinguishing the sensation from the sense-datum vanishes. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind [1921], Lec. VIII) | |
A reaction: This is the reason why Russell himself rejected sense-data. It is more normal, I think, to reject them simply as being superfluous. If the subject can simply perceive the sense-data, why can't they just perceive the object more directly? |
6098 | Perception goes straight to the fact, and not through the proposition [Russell] |
Full Idea: I am inclined to think that perception, as opposed to belief, does go straight to the fact and not through the proposition. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §IV.4) | |
A reaction: There seems to be a question of an intermediate stage, which is the formulation of concepts. Is full 'perception' (backed by attention and intellect) laden with concepts, which point to facts? Where are the facts in sensation without recognition? |