display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
3 ideas
7639 | The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally [Evans] |
Full Idea: The 'homunculus fallacy' attempts to explain what is involved in a subject's being related to objects in the external world by appealing to the existence of an inner situation which recapitulates the essential features of the original situation. | |
From: Gareth Evans (Molyneux's Question [1978], p.397) | |
A reaction: This is obviously right, but we aren't forced to settle for direct realism. Inner perception may be very different, or we may employ the idea of Dennett and Lycan, that the homunculi don't regress, they deteriorate steadily down into mechanisms. |
12580 | Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco] |
Full Idea: In Evans's work experiences are conceived of as not having a conceptual content at all. | |
From: report of Gareth Evans (The Varieties of Reference [1980]) by John Greco - Justification is not Internal | |
A reaction: I presume it is this view which provoked McDowell's contrary view in 'Mind and World'. I say this is a job for neuroscience, and I struggle to see what philosophical questions hang on the outcome. I think I side with Evans. |
7643 | We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans] |
Full Idea: Do we really understand the proposal that we have as many colour concepts as there are shades colour that we can sensibly discriminate? | |
From: Gareth Evans (The Varieties of Reference [1980], 7.5) | |
A reaction: This is the argument (rejected by McDowell) that experience cannot be conceptual because experience is too rich. We should not confuse lack of concepts with lack of words. I may have a concept of a colour between two shades, but no word for it. |