display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
2 ideas
23231 | I immediately know myself, and anything beyond that is an inference [Fichte] |
Full Idea: Immediately I know only of myself. What I am able to know beyond that I am only able to know through inference. | |
From: Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], 1) | |
A reaction: A direct descendant of the Cartesian Cogito, I assume. Personally, if I bang my head on a beam I take the beam to be a full paid-up member of reality. Is it not possible that he also knows himself through inference? Do animals infer reality? |
5691 | The adverbial account of sensation says not 'see a red image' but be 'appeared to redly' [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: Some who reject the act-object conception of sensation favour an 'adverbial' account, where (instead of the act of 'seeing a red image') it is better to speak of 'being appeared to redly'. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Introspection [1994], p.398) | |
A reaction: The point is that you couldn't perceive without a colour (or travel without a speed), so the qualifying adverb is intrinsic to the process, not a separate object. The adverbial theory will imply a fairly minimal account of universals. |