display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
3 ideas
6366 | Perception causes beliefs in us, without inference or justification [Pollock/Cruz] |
Full Idea: Perception is a causal process that inputs beliefs into our doxastic system without their being inferred from or justified on the basis of other beliefs we already have. | |
From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §3.2.3) | |
A reaction: This topic is much discussed (e.g. by MacDowell). I don't see how something is going to qualify as a 'belief' if it doesn't involve concepts and propositions. The point that we are caused to have many of our beliefs (rather than judging) seems right. |
23231 | I immediately know myself, and anything beyond that is an inference [Fichte] |
Full Idea: Immediately I know only of myself. What I am able to know beyond that I am only able to know through inference. | |
From: Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], 1) | |
A reaction: A direct descendant of the Cartesian Cogito, I assume. Personally, if I bang my head on a beam I take the beam to be a full paid-up member of reality. Is it not possible that he also knows himself through inference? Do animals infer reality? |
6362 | Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances [Pollock/Cruz] |
Full Idea: We think it is a mistake to suppose that the evidence of our senses comes to us in the form of beliefs; in perception, the beliefs we form are almost invariably about the objective properties of physical objects - not about how they appear to us. | |
From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.5.5) | |
A reaction: The tricky word here is 'evidence'. At what point in the process of perception does something begin to count as evidence? It must at least involve concepts (and maybe even propositions) if it is going to be thought about in that way. |