display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
47 ideas
| 9156 | Kant's shift of view enables us to see a priority in terms of mental capacity, not truth and propositions [Burge on Kant] |
| Full Idea: Kant's shift in his understanding of apriority from the content of truth and of proof-sequences of propositions to the character of cognitive procedures opens more possibilities for understanding the sources of apriority, in capacities and mental acts. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Tyler Burge - Frege on Apriority I | |
| A reaction: [Burge attributes the alternative view to Leibniz and Frege] This harmless-looking thought seems to me right at the heart of what I take to be a discrete cold war going on between logicians and philosophers. Logic is in retreat! |
| 7575 | A priori knowledge is limited to objects of possible experience [Kant, by Jolley] |
| Full Idea: Kant says that a priori knowledge is limited to objects of possible experience, and this is the core thesis of his distinctive doctrine of transcendental idealism. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Nicholas Jolley - Leibniz Ch.8 | |
| A reaction: Some people would even challenge this bold claim for a priori knowledge, but this idea shows why Kant was said to have put an end to old fashioned speculative metaphysics. For Kant, a priori knowledge seems to be something like introspection. |
| 12414 | A priori knowledge occurs absolutely independently of all experience [Kant] |
| Full Idea: We will understand by a priori cognitions not those that occur independently of this or that experience, but rather those that occur absolutely independently of all experience. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B003) | |
| A reaction: Kitcher quotes this, and raises questions about how widely we should understand 'experience', and how strongly we can assert total 'independence'. But then he is attacking the whole idea of a priori knowledge. He modifies Kant's formulation (Idea 12415). |
| 9351 | One sort of a priori knowledge just analyses given concepts, but another ventures further [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Analysis of concepts affords us a multitude of cognitions which are illuminations or clarifications of what is already thought, and yields a priori cognition. Reason also surreptitiously makes a priori assertions, which add something alien to the concept. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B009/A5) | |
| A reaction: This is at the heart of Kant's programme, to disentangle these two, and especially to turn a strong critical light on the second one. He does not deny the possibility of a priori knowledge beyond conceptual analysis, but is wary. |
| 9348 | Experienceless bodies have space; propertyless bodies have substance; this must be seen a priori [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Remove from your experiential concept of a body everything empirical (colour, hardness etc), and there still remains its space. If you remove all the properties which experience teaches you, there remains substance. This shows your a priori faculty. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B006) | |
| A reaction: Presumably you can also 'remove' the space and the substance. Maybe there are no actual items such as spaces or substances, so getting both of them wrong wouldn't be a good advertisement for the faculty. It's just imagination? |
| 21081 | We are equipped with the a priori intuitions needed for the concept of right [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Reason has taken care that the understanding is as fully equipped as possible with a priori intuitions for the construction of the concept of right. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right [1797], Intro E) | |
| A reaction: A priori intuitions are not the same as innate knowledge or innate concepts, but they must require some sort of inbuilt inner resources. Further evidence that Kant is a rationalist philosopher (if we were unsure). |
| 5404 | Two plus two objects make four objects even if experience is impossible, so Kant is wrong [Russell on Kant] |
| Full Idea: Two physical objects and two other physical objects must make four physical objects, even if physical objects cannot be experienced, so Kant's solution unduly limits the scope of a priori propositions. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Bertrand Russell - Problems of Philosophy Ch.8 | |
| A reaction: The point seems good, though it is doubtful whether Russell is entitled to be so confident. If the basis of a priori certainty is pushed outside the mind, our ontology becomes dramatically more complicated. |
| 9345 | Propositions involving necessity are a priori, and pure a priori if they only derive from other necessities [Kant] |
| Full Idea: If a proposition is thought along with its necessity, it is an a priori judgement; if it is, moreover, also not derived from any proposition except one that in turn is valid as a necessary proposition, then it is absolutely a priori. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B003) | |
| A reaction: The misunderstanding behind this is that we can obtain certainty in this way. I presume that consistency with empirical experience would increase our certainty of (say) maths or logic. There is no 'pure' a priori, delivering 'pure' necessity. |
| 16893 | The apriori is independent of its sources, and marked by necessity and generality [Kant, by Burge] |
| Full Idea: Kant defines apriority in terms of independence from genesis and from sense experience, and it is indicated by its necessity and by it generality or universality. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B003-4) by Tyler Burge - Frege on Apriority (with ps) 2 |
| 9347 | A priori knowledge is indispensable for the possibility and certainty of experience [Kant] |
| Full Idea: One could establish the indispensability of the reality of pure a priori principles for the possibility of experience itself, and thus establish it a priori. Where would experience gets its certainty if it was based on empirical, contingent rules? | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B005) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] There seems a touch of circularity here, apart from the transcendental argument. Proving the a priori by a priori means? All very odd. And experience is certain because it is based on a priori rules, which are necessary? |
| 3342 | Seeing that only one parallel can be drawn to a line through a given point is clearly synthetic a priori [Kant, by Benardete,JA] |
| Full Idea: Kant took Euclidean geometry to be an obvious source of synthetic a prior truths, as one can just see that through a point outside a straight line one and only one parallel to it can be drawn. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.18 |
| 3726 | The categorical imperative is a practical synthetic a priori proposition [Kant] |
| Full Idea: With the categorical imperative or law of morality we have a very serious difficulty, because it is a synthetic a priori practical proposition. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 420.50) |
| 20943 | Kant bases the synthetic a priori on the categories of oneness and manyness [Kant, by Bowie] |
| Full Idea: The categories of oneness and manyness are the basis of what Kant terms 'synthetic judgements a priori'. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy 1 'First' | |
| A reaction: This is a solution to the paradoxes of one and many that bothered Plato. I think it is best seen in our capacity to count things, and the individuation which must precede that. Atomism and holism. |
| 5402 | Kant showed that we have a priori knowledge which is not purely analytic [Kant, by Russell] |
| Full Idea: Kant deserves credit for showing that we have a priori knowledge which is not purely 'analytic', i.e. such that the opposite would be self-contradictory. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Bertrand Russell - Problems of Philosophy Ch. 8 | |
| A reaction: It is noteworthy that a great empiricist philosopher makes this judgement. But how do you spot an a priori truth, apart from seeing that its opposite would be a contradiction? Where else can its force come from? |
| 5203 | We can think of 7 and 5 without 12, but it is still a contradiction to deny 7+5=12 [Ayer on Kant] |
| Full Idea: From the fact that one can think of the sum of seven and five without necessarily thinking of twelve, it by no means follows that the proposition '7+5=12' can be denied without self-contradiction. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by A.J. Ayer - Language,Truth and Logic Ch.4 | |
| A reaction: Kant's claim that arithmetic was synthetic always looked glib and dubious, and this pinpoints an objection very nicely. It appears that the great Kant has confused his epistemology with his ontology. |
| 16916 | A priori synthetic knowledge is only of appearances, not of things in themselves [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Through intuition we can only know objects as they appear to us (to our senses), not as they may be in themselves; and this presupposition is absolutely necessary if synthetic propositions a priori are to be granted as possible. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 283) | |
| A reaction: This idea is basic to understanding Kant, and especially his claim that arithmetic is a priori synthetic. |
| 5527 | That a straight line is the shortest is synthetic, as straight does not imply any quantity [Kant] |
| Full Idea: That the straight line between two points is the shortest is a synthetic proposition. For my concept of the straight contains nothing of quantity, but only a quality. The concept of shortest is additional, and cannot be extracted by analysis. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B016) | |
| A reaction: We should ask Kant to define 'straight' without mentioning 'shortest'. If you think of a long walk between two towns, it becomes obvious that the straight line will be defined by being the shortest line. |
| 5528 | That force and counter-force are equal is necessary, and a priori synthetic [Kant] |
| Full Idea: In the proposition that in all communication of motion effect and counter-effect must always be equal, not only the necessity, and thus its a priori origin, but also that it is a synthetic proposition is clear. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B017) | |
| A reaction: No, I don't follow that. God might have made Newton's Third Law that every time you push a wall it pushes you back with double force. Looks like a Humean a posteriori observation of regularity to me. |
| 5529 | The real problem of pure reason is: how are a priori synthetic judgments possible? [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The real problem of pure reason is contained in the question: How are synthetic judgments a priori possible? | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B019) | |
| A reaction: If they are possible, I would say that is not 'the real problem of pure reason', but the real problem of understanding the underlying nature of reality. I doubt whether we know much of reality by 'pure' reason, but we might 'see' that it is necessary. |
| 5537 | That two lines cannot enclose a space is an intuitive a priori synthetic proposition [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The proposition that with two straight lines no space can be enclosed cannot be derived from the concept of straight lines and the number two. You are forced to take refuge in intuition, ..which is a pure a priori intuition of a synthetic proposition. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B065/A47) | |
| A reaction: A very nice example. If you gave a child two rods and told them to make a shape, they might quickly learn this from experience. Kant's proposal is nice, but I am not convinced. We learn that to create shapes you must turn corners. |
| 5546 | Are a priori concepts necessary as a precondition for something to be an object? [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The question is whether a priori concepts precede, as conditions under which alone something can be, if not intuited, nevertheless thought as objects in general. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B125/A93) | |
| A reaction: This remains a good question. Some sort of synthesis of impressions is required in order to perceive an object. To think of it as a rational inference seems wildly wrong, as it is instantaneous. How do dogs get along, I wonder…. |
| 5558 | 7+5=12 is not analytic, because 12 is not contained in 7 or 5 or their combination [Kant] |
| Full Idea: 7+5=12 is not an analytic proposition, for I do not think the number 12 either in the representation of 7 nor in that of 5 nor in the representation of the combination of the two. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B205/A164) | |
| A reaction: Unconvincing. The third option sounds analytic. Present it as: if you start at 7 and move 5 places along the natural number sequence, you have arrived at the answer (so find out its name). Or rename '12' as 'sevenplusfive'? |
| 5624 | We possess synthetic a priori knowledge in our principles which anticipate experience [Kant] |
| Full Idea: We are already in possession of synthetic a priori cognition, as is established by the principles of understanding, which anticipate experience. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B790/A762) | |
| A reaction: When put like this, I remain unconvinced that the mental states to which Kant refers should actually qualify as cognition/knowledge. If we have to look through rose-tinted spectacles, this doesn't make rose-colour a truth, or even a belief. |
| 5571 | Reason contains within itself certain underived concepts and principles [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Reason itself contains the origin of certain concepts and principles, which it derives neither from the senses nor from the understanding. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B355/A299) | |
| A reaction: You might say that these principles are known 'by the natural light' rather than being innate, but if they are not even 'derived from the understanding', that seems to leave them innate, which is a classic hallmark of a rationalist philosopher. |
| 5403 | If, as Kant says, arithmetic and logic are contributed by us, they could change if we did [Russell on Kant] |
| Full Idea: The main objection to Kant's philosophy is that to say that logic and arithmetic are contributed by us does not account for its certainty; if Kant is right, then tomorrow our nature could so change as to make two and two become five. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Bertrand Russell - Problems of Philosophy Ch.8 | |
| A reaction: One would expect a realist like Russell to have fairly fundamental objections to the implied anti-realism (and conventionalism) of Kant. The same comment could be made about Kant's view of space, time and causation. |
| 5525 | No analysis of the sum of seven and five will in itself reveal twelve [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The concept of twelve is by no means already thought merely by my thinking of the unification of seven and five, and no matter how long I analyze my concept of such a possible sum I will still not find twelve in it. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B015) | |
| A reaction: I don't find this convincing. All sums can be revealed by analysing the relationships within the sequence of natural numbers. |
| 18262 | For Kant analytic knowledge needs complex concepts, but the a priori can rest on the simple [Coffa on Kant] |
| Full Idea: As Kant saw it, analytic knowledge is possible only in the presence of conceptual complexity, but it should have been clear that simple concepts, unaided by intuition, are as apt as their complex counterparts to act as grounds of a priori knowledge. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 1 'Analyt' | |
| A reaction: The point is that the concept must 'contain' something for Kant's account of what is analytic. This seems to be a very important thought for those who think the a priori is entirely analytic. |
| 16915 | A priori intuitions can only concern the objects of our senses [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Intuitions which are possible a priori can never concern any other things than objects of our senses. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 283) | |
| A reaction: Given the Kantian idea that what is known a priori will also be necessary, we might have had great hopes for big-time metaphysics, but this idea cuts it down to size. Personally, I don't think we are totally imprisoned in the phenomena. |
| 5526 | With large numbers it is obvious that we could never find the sum by analysing the concepts [Kant] |
| Full Idea: It is clearer that all arithmetical propositions are synthetic if we take larger numbers, for it is then clear that, twist and turn our concepts as we will, without help from intuition we could never find the sum by means of the mere analysis of concepts. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B016) | |
| A reaction: I don't see this. Obviously we may not know the name of the number which is the answer. We must analyse 'plus' as well as the component numbers. How can it be synthetic if no experience is involved? |
| 16914 | A priori intuition of objects is only possible by containing the form of my sensibility [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The only way for my intuition to precede the reality of the object and take place as knowledge a priori is if it contains nothing else than the form of sensibility which in me as subject precedes all real impressions through which I'm affected by objects. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 283) | |
| A reaction: This may be the single most famous idea in Kant. I'm not really a Kantian, but this is a powerful idea, the culmination of Descartes' proposal to start philosophy by looking at ourselves. No subsequent thinking can ignore the idea. |
| 5567 | A priori the understanding can only anticipate possible experiences [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The understanding can never accomplish a priori anything more than to anticipate the form of a possible experience in general. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B303/A246) | |
| A reaction: This is why many people think that Kant brough metaphysical (ontological) speculation to an end. He asserts that synthetic a priori knowledge is possible, but then imposes a huge limitation on it. |
| 18264 | We know the shape of a cone from its concept, but we don't know its colour [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The shape of a cone we can form for ourselves in intuition, unassisted by any experience, according to its concept alone, but the colour of this cone must be previously given in some experience or other. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B743/A715) | |
| A reaction: Coffa says this gives a 'transcendental twist' to the primary/secondary distinction. The distinction doesn't seem to help much, since you clearly don't know the shape of a pebble from its concept. Is the angle of the cone part of its concept? |
| 21447 | I can make no sense of the red experience being similar to the quality in the object [Kant] |
| Full Idea: I can make little sense of the assertion that the sensation of red is similar to the property of the vermilion [cinnabar] which excites this sensation in me. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 290) | |
| A reaction: A sensible remark. In Kant's case it is probably a part of his scepticism that his intuitions reveal anything directly about reality. Locke seems to have thought (reasonably enough) that the experience contains some sort of valid information. |
| 5532 | Colours and tastes are not qualities of things, but alterations of the subject [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Things like colors, taste etc. are correctly considered not as qualities of things but as mere alterations of our subject, which can even be different in different people. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B045/A29) | |
| A reaction: This acceptance of the category of 'secondary' qualities shows that Kant is not totally daft about reality. He 'considers them as' alterations in the subject, but how does he view primary qualities? Not, I think, as features of the noumenon. |
| 16924 | I count the primary features of things (as well as the secondary ones) as mere appearances [Kant] |
| Full Idea: I also count as mere appearances, in addition to [heat, colour, taste], the remaining qualities of bodies which are called primariae, extension, place, and space in general, with all that depends on it (impenetrability or materiality, shape etc.). | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 289 n.II) | |
| A reaction: He sides with Berkeley and Hume against Locke and Boyle. He denies being an idealist (Idea 16923), so it seems to me that Kant might be described as a 'phenomenalist'. |
| 16913 | I can't intuit a present thing in itself, because the properties can't enter my representations [Kant] |
| Full Idea: It seems inconceivable how the intuition of a thing that is present should make me know it as it is in itself, for its properties cannot migrate into my faculty of representation. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 282) | |
| A reaction: One might compare this with Locke's distinction of primary and secondary, where the primary properties seem to 'migrate into my faculty of representation', but the secondary ones fail to do so. I think I prefer Locke. This idea threatens idealism. |
| 2774 | Kant says the cognitive and sensory elements in experience can't be separated [Kant, by Dancy,J] |
| Full Idea: Kant maintains that it is impossible to draw a suitable distinction between the cognitive and sensory 'elements' in sensory experience. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 8.4 |
| 23454 | Appearances have a 'form', which indicates a relational order [Kant] |
| Full Idea: That which allows the manifold of appearance to be intuited as ordered in certain relations I call the 'form' of appearance. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B034/A20) | |
| A reaction: An important idea, which figures prominently in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Presumably the noumenon is responsible for generating the form in the appearances, and we infer the order of the world thereby (though we can't prove it). |
| 5569 | We cannot represent objects unless we combine concepts with intuitions [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Understanding and sensibility can determine an object only in combination; if we separate them, then we have intuitions without concepts, or concepts without intuitions, but in either case representations that we cannot relate to any determinate objects. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B314/A258) | |
| A reaction: Although Kant seems to be rejecting the rationalist v empiricist debate, I take this to be evidence that Kant was a rationalist, because he thinks understanding cannot arise just from sensibility. |
| 23697 | I exist just as an intelligence aware of its faculty for combination [Kant] |
| Full Idea: I exist as an intelligence that is merely conscious of its faculty for combination. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B158) | |
| A reaction: [plucked from a complex context!] This thought seems to have its origins in Hume's account of associations, and is a fairly accurate piece of introspection, I would say. I could think of my Self simply as the thing which unites some diverse experiences. |
| 22005 | Associations and causes cannot explain content, which needs norms of judgement [Kant, by Pinkard] |
| Full Idea: Kant said the representational content of thought could not be explained by patterns of association or by naturalistically understood causal patterns; the cognitive content of thought is constituted entirely by the norms governing judgemental synthesis. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 01 | |
| A reaction: I'd be inclined to say that it needs a concept of truth, rather than Kant's tangle of norms and categories. Maybe the content is there before the associations get to work. |
| 6577 | For Kant, our conceptual scheme is disastrous when it reaches beyond experience [Kant, by Fogelin] |
| Full Idea: For Kant, the conceptual apparatus that structures our experience for us will inevitably lead to intellectual disasters when it is applied to matters completely beyond experience. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: This is the empiricist side of Kant, influenced by Hume. I don't agree with Kant on this. I just think that speculation and abstract theory are much more difficult and error-prone than science, because you can't keep checking against raw facts. |
| 16925 | Appearance gives truth, as long as it is only used within experience [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Appearance brings forth truth so long as it is used in experience, but as soon as it goes beyond the boundary of experience and becomes transcendent, it brings forth nothing but illusion. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 292 n.III) | |
| A reaction: This is the nearest I have found to Kant declaring for empiricism. It sounds something like direct realism, if experience itself can bring forth truth. |
| 5538 | Understanding has no intuitions, and senses no thought, so knowledge needs their unity [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The understanding is not capable of intuiting anything, and the senses are not capable of thinking anything. Only from their unification can cognition arise. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B075/A51) | |
| A reaction: At first glance this seems to settle the rationalist-empiricist debate at a stroke, by rejecting the rationalist dream of knowledge arising from pure intuitions, and the empiricist dream of knowledge from pure sensation. It can't be that simple, though… |
| 5559 | Sensations are a posteriori, but that they come in degrees is known a priori [Kant] |
| Full Idea: All sensations are given only a posteriori, but their property of have a degree can be cognised only a priori. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B218/A176) | |
| A reaction: Study the context to be fair to Kant, but this seems very unconvincing. If we were constructed in some more digital way, our sensations might be binary, so their 'degree' can hardly be a necessity. |
| 8736 | Kantian intuitions are of particulars, and they give immediate knowledge [Kant, by Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: For Kant, intuitions are singular, in the sense that they are modes of representing individual objects, and are needed for numbers and geometric figures; ..they also yield immediate knowledge, and are tied to sense perceptions. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 4.2 | |
| A reaction: The ordinary usage of the word 'intuition' agrees on the immediate knowledge produced, but not on the 'singular' aspect of it, so that is the respect in which Kant's use is a term of art. Why have a special faculty for singular apprehensions? |
| 16911 | Intuition is a representation that depends on the presence of the object [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Intuition is a representation, such as would depend on the presence of the object. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 282) | |
| A reaction: This is a distinctively Kantian view of intuition, which arises through particulars, rather than the direct apprehension of generalities. |