display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
7 ideas
3887 | Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori [Scruton] |
Full Idea: 'Every event has a cause' and 'truth is correspondence to facts' are candidates for being synthetic a priori knowledge. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 13.2) |
4264 | Perception (which involves an assessment) is a higher state than sensation [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Perception is a higher state than sensation: it involves not just a response to the outer world, but also an assessment of it. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.14) | |
A reaction: This seems to me a simple but really important distinction, even though it wickedly uses the word 'higher', which Greeks like but post-Humeans struggle with. But we all know it is higher, don't we? |
3901 | Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Touch seems to deliver a purely primary-quality account of the world. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 24) | |
A reaction: Interesting, though a little over-confident. It seems occasionally possible for touch to be an illusion. |
3885 | We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Bradley argued that we cannot conceive of primary qualities except as attached to secondary qualities. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 10.1) |
3910 | If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? [Scruton] |
Full Idea: If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what do secondary qualities inhere in? | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], Ch.10 n) | |
A reaction: What is the problem? A pin causes me pain, but I know the pain isn't in the pin. It is the same with colour. It is a mental property, if you like, triggered by a wavelength of radiation. |
3899 | The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton] |
Full Idea: The representational theory is the unsurprising view that perceptual states are intentional, like beliefs, emotions and desires. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 23.3) |
6493 | We are not conscious of pure liquidity, but of the liquidity of water [Firth] |
Full Idea: We are not conscious of liquidity, coldness, and solidity, but of the liquidity of water, the coldness of ice, and the solidity of rocks. | |
From: Roderick Firth (Sense Data and the Percept Theory [1949]), quoted by Howard Robinson - Perception 1.7 | |
A reaction: A nice point, but it might not be entirely true in a blindfold test, where one might only report properties like 'sticky' or 'warm', without having any clear concept of the substance being experienced. Firth is proposing the 'percept theory'. |