Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Carl Ginet, Colin McGinn and Howard Robinson

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28 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
6502 Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H]
6513 Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
22413 Being red simply consists in looking red [McGinn]
22415 Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements [McGinn]
22416 Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible [McGinn]
22422 Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities [McGinn]
22428 You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square [McGinn]
6512 Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
22414 You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness [McGinn]
22423 Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature [McGinn]
22426 We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created [McGinn]
6497 We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
22412 Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences [McGinn]
22421 Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception? [McGinn]
6499 Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H]
6500 If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H]
22424 Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise [McGinn]
22425 The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings [McGinn]
6494 If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
7629 We see objects 'directly' by representing them [McGinn]
6484 Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
6508 Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
6480 Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H]
6482 For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
6505 Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
6506 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H]
6507 Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H]
6511 If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H]