Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Jerry A. Fodor, Immanuel Kant and E.J. Lowe

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18 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
Properties or qualities are essentially adjectival, not objectual [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
We know the shape of a cone from its concept, but we don't know its colour [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
I can make no sense of the red experience being similar to the quality in the object [Kant]
Colours and tastes are not qualities of things, but alterations of the subject [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
I count the primary features of things (as well as the secondary ones) as mere appearances [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
I can't intuit a present thing in itself, because the properties can't enter my representations [Kant]
One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form [Lowe]
Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information [Lowe]
Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Kant says the cognitive and sensory elements in experience can't be separated [Kant, by Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Appearances have a 'form', which indicates a relational order [Kant]
Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved [Fodor]
Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe]
If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong [Lowe]
A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially? [Lowe]