Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, PG and Bertrand Russell
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45 ideas
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
7554
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Self-evidence is often a mere will-o'-the-wisp [Russell]
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5412
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Some propositions are self-evident, but their implications may also be self-evident [Russell]
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5413
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Particular instances are more clearly self-evident than any general principles [Russell]
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5415
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As shown by memory, self-evidence comes in degrees [Russell]
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5416
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If self-evidence has degrees, we should accept the more self-evident as correct [Russell]
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
5397
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The rationalists were right, because we know logical principles without experience [Russell]
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
3876
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If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw [PG]
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
4430
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All a priori knowledge deals with the relations of universals [Russell]
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5411
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We can know some general propositions by universals, when no instance can be given [Russell]
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
6514
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Russell's representationalism says primary qualities only show the structure of reality [Russell, by Robinson,H]
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
6415
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After 1912, Russell said sense-data are last in analysis, not first in experience [Russell, by Grayling]
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5358
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'Sense-data' are what are immediately known in sensation, such as colours or roughnesses [Russell]
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6417
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In 1921 Russell abandoned sense-data, and the gap between sensation and object [Russell, by Grayling]
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6474
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Seeing is not in itself knowledge, but is separate from what is seen, such as a patch of colour [Russell]
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
6467
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No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell]
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6483
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Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H]
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8244
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Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari]
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6462
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Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell]
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6463
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Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell]
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6464
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Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell]
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7549
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If my body literally lost its mind, the object seen when I see a flash would still exist [Russell]
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7553
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Sense-data are purely physical [Russell]
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / c. Unperceived sense-data
6459
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We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data [Russell]
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6460
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'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind [Russell]
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6461
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Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands [Russell]
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21583
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When sense-data change, there must be indistinguishable sense-data in the process [Russell]
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
8854
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My 'acquaintance' with sense-data is nothing like my knowing New York [Williams,M on Russell]
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6458
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Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell]
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6469
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Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell]
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6476
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We cannot assume that the subject actually exists, so we cannot distinguish sensations from sense-data [Russell]
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
6098
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Perception goes straight to the fact, and not through the proposition [Russell]
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12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
21577
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Empirical truths are particular, so general truths need an a priori input of generality [Russell]
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12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
7290
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If Russell rejects innate ideas and direct a priori knowledge, he is left with a tabula rasa [Russell, by Thompson]
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5357
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It is natural to begin from experience, and presumably that is the basis of knowledge [Russell]
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5382
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We are acquainted with outer and inner sensation, memory, Self, and universals [Russell, by PG]
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5389
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Knowledge by descriptions enables us to transcend private experience [Russell]
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16476
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For simple words, a single experience can show that they are true [Russell]
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12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
6441
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Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell]
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12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
21532
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Full empiricism is not tenable, but empirical investigation is always essential [Russell]
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5376
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I can know the existence of something with which nobody is acquainted [Russell]
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16485
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Perception can't prove universal generalisations, so abandon them, or abandon empiricism? [Russell]
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16488
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It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell]
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6431
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Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell]
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12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
5414
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Images are not memory, because they are present, and memories are of the past [Russell]
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2792
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It is possible the world came into existence five minutes ago, complete with false memories [Russell]
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