Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Myles F. Burnyeat, Immanuel Kant and Yale Kamisar

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47 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
9156 Kant's shift of view enables us to see a priority in terms of mental capacity, not truth and propositions [Burge on Kant]
7575 A priori knowledge is limited to objects of possible experience [Kant, by Jolley]
12414 A priori knowledge occurs absolutely independently of all experience [Kant]
9351 One sort of a priori knowledge just analyses given concepts, but another ventures further [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
9348 Experienceless bodies have space; propertyless bodies have substance; this must be seen a priori [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
21081 We are equipped with the a priori intuitions needed for the concept of right [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
5404 Two plus two objects make four objects even if experience is impossible, so Kant is wrong [Russell on Kant]
9345 Propositions involving necessity are a priori, and pure a priori if they only derive from other necessities [Kant]
16893 The apriori is independent of its sources, and marked by necessity and generality [Kant, by Burge]
9347 A priori knowledge is indispensable for the possibility and certainty of experience [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
3342 Seeing that only one parallel can be drawn to a line through a given point is clearly synthetic a priori [Kant, by Benardete,JA]
3726 The categorical imperative is a practical synthetic a priori proposition [Kant]
20943 Kant bases the synthetic a priori on the categories of oneness and manyness [Kant, by Bowie]
5402 Kant showed that we have a priori knowledge which is not purely analytic [Kant, by Russell]
5203 We can think of 7 and 5 without 12, but it is still a contradiction to deny 7+5=12 [Ayer on Kant]
16916 A priori synthetic knowledge is only of appearances, not of things in themselves [Kant]
5527 That a straight line is the shortest is synthetic, as straight does not imply any quantity [Kant]
5528 That force and counter-force are equal is necessary, and a priori synthetic [Kant]
5529 The real problem of pure reason is: how are a priori synthetic judgments possible? [Kant]
5537 That two lines cannot enclose a space is an intuitive a priori synthetic proposition [Kant]
5546 Are a priori concepts necessary as a precondition for something to be an object? [Kant]
5558 7+5=12 is not analytic, because 12 is not contained in 7 or 5 or their combination [Kant]
5624 We possess synthetic a priori knowledge in our principles which anticipate experience [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
5571 Reason contains within itself certain underived concepts and principles [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
5403 If, as Kant says, arithmetic and logic are contributed by us, they could change if we did [Russell on Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
5525 No analysis of the sum of seven and five will in itself reveal twelve [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
18262 For Kant analytic knowledge needs complex concepts, but the a priori can rest on the simple [Coffa on Kant]
16915 A priori intuitions can only concern the objects of our senses [Kant]
5526 With large numbers it is obvious that we could never find the sum by analysing the concepts [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
16914 A priori intuition of objects is only possible by containing the form of my sensibility [Kant]
5567 A priori the understanding can only anticipate possible experiences [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
18264 We know the shape of a cone from its concept, but we don't know its colour [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
21447 I can make no sense of the red experience being similar to the quality in the object [Kant]
5532 Colours and tastes are not qualities of things, but alterations of the subject [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
16924 I count the primary features of things (as well as the secondary ones) as mere appearances [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
16913 I can't intuit a present thing in itself, because the properties can't enter my representations [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
2774 Kant says the cognitive and sensory elements in experience can't be separated [Kant, by Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
23454 Appearances have a 'form', which indicates a relational order [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
5569 We cannot represent objects unless we combine concepts with intuitions [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
23697 I exist just as an intelligence aware of its faculty for combination [Kant]
22005 Associations and causes cannot explain content, which needs norms of judgement [Kant, by Pinkard]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
6577 For Kant, our conceptual scheme is disastrous when it reaches beyond experience [Kant, by Fogelin]
16925 Appearance gives truth, as long as it is only used within experience [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
5538 Understanding has no intuitions, and senses no thought, so knowledge needs their unity [Kant]
5559 Sensations are a posteriori, but that they come in degrees is known a priori [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
8736 Kantian intuitions are of particulars, and they give immediate knowledge [Kant, by Shapiro]
16911 Intuition is a representation that depends on the presence of the object [Kant]