Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Stilpo, Paul Boghossian and George Berkeley
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19 ideas
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
9369
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'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian]
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9367
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The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian]
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9373
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That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian]
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9380
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We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian]
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
9384
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We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian]
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
3933
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Primary qualities (such as shape, solidity, mass) are held to really exist, unlike secondary qualities [Berkeley]
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
6726
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No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities [Berkeley]
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6728
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Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion [Berkeley]
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6727
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Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold [Berkeley]
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3934
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A mite would see its own foot as large, though we would see it as tiny [Berkeley]
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3935
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The apparent size of an object varies with its distance away, so that can't be a property of the object [Berkeley]
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3937
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'Solidity' is either not a sensible quality at all, or it is clearly relative to our senses [Berkeley]
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3940
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Distance is not directly perceived by sight [Berkeley]
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
6495
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Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism [Robinson,H on Berkeley]
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3957
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Immediate objects of perception, which some treat as appearances, I treat as the real things themselves [Berkeley]
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12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
6720
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Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations [Berkeley]
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3953
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Real things and imaginary or dreamed things differ because the latter are much fainter [Berkeley]
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12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
3938
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Geometry is originally perceived by senses, and so is not purely intellectual [Berkeley]
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12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
9374
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If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian]
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