display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
2 ideas
3790 | Causes of beliefs are irrelevant to their contents [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: The causes of our belief in a proposition are indeed irrelevant to the question of what we believe. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Zettel [1950], i.437) | |
A reaction: This should have nipped the causal theory of knowledge in the bud before it got started. Everyone has a different cause for their belief that 'it sometimes rains'. Cause is not justification. |
6597 | A rule of justification might be: don't raise the level of scrutiny without a good reason [Fogelin] |
Full Idea: One rule for the justification of knowledge might be: Do not raise the level of scrutiny in the absence of a particular reason that triggers it. | |
From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: That won't decide the appropriate level of scrutiny from which to start. One of my maxims is 'don't set the bar too high', but it seems tough that one should have to justify moving it. The early scientists tried raising it, and were amazed by the results. |