display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
8 ideas
| 2731 | Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge) [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: There are four possible kinds of epistemic chain: infinite and unanchored, circular and unanchored, anchored in a belief which is not knowledge, and anchored in a belief which is bedrock knowledge. | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.183) | |
| A reaction: About right, though I don't think 'chain' is the right word for what is proposed if justification is to be coherent. The justifications float like lilies in the pond of reason, and a Self (Monet?) seems needed to assess the picture |
| 2739 | Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: Internalists about justification tend to conceive of it as a matter of having a right to believe something. | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.234) | |
| A reaction: I'm an internalist, but I don't understand this, unless it refers to the social aspect of justification. Can I grant myself internal rights? I can justify my belief to other people. |
| 2732 | Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: That 7+5=12 and that carrots are nourishing are mutually consistent, but do not exhibit coherence. | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.192) | |
| A reaction: This shows how difficult it would be to define 'coherent'. Is 'carrots are nourishing' coherent with 'fish are nourishing'? Is the battle of Hastings coherent with the battle of Waterloo? |
| 2733 | It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: It is very difficult to specify when an explanatory relation generates enough coherence to create justification. | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.193) | |
| A reaction: I take coherence to be the key concept in epistemology, and quite impossible to define. This is why the 'space of reasons' is a useful concept. It is a courtroom, in which each case is different. |
| 2734 | A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: A schizophrenic who thinks he is Napoleon, if he has a completely consistent story with enough interlocking details, may have a belief system that is superbly coherent. | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.194) | |
| A reaction: This is an exaggeration, but the fact is that one isolated lie is totally coherent, so coherence can only emerge when a system is large. Sense experience must be central to coherence. |
| 2738 | Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: If someone consistently prophesied the winners of horse races, it appears that this man knows who will win the races, but surely he does not have justified beliefs as to who will win? | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.229) | |
| A reaction: This is where internalists and externalists (notably reliabilists) sharply part company. IF a reliable clairvoyant appeared, we would eventually accept them as a knower. But they DON'T appear, because knowledge needs justification! |
| 2740 | A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: If one favours a reliability theory of knowledge (which is externalist) the correspondence theory of truth seems the most appropriate. | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.243) | |
| A reaction: Sounds right. Coherence implies some sort of internal assessment, whereas correspondence just needs to plugged into the facts. I like coherence justification and correspondence truth. |
| 2737 | 'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: Reliabilism cannot specify how reliable a process must be before it grounds knowledge, and it cannot specify what is reliable in the first place. 'Reliable' may become circular, and may mean 'justified'. | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.225) | |
| A reaction: The first time you ever read an instrument, or talk to a stranger, you have no indication of reliability. Circularity looks like a big problem. Knowledge must precede reliability? |