Combining Philosophers

Ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Richard G. Heck and John Locke

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5 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
19517 Believing without a reason may just be love of your own fantasies [Locke]
     Full Idea: He that believes, without having any reason for believing, may be in love with his own fancies.
     From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.17.24)
     A reaction: This comes close to Clifford's Principle, though he demands 'evidence', rather than a reason. Of course, the supposed 'reason' may be just as much of a fantasy as the belief!
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
15977 Facts beyond immediate experience are assessed by agreement with known truths and observations [Locke]
     Full Idea: What comes not within the scrutiny of the human senses ...can appear more or less probable only as they more or less agree to truths that are established in the our minds, and as they hold proportion to other parts of our knowledge and observation.
     From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.16.12)
     A reaction: This remark strikes me as an excellent attempt to get at what we mean by coherence in justification. It is also, note, a good account of what we would count as a best explanation.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
2555 For Locke knowledge relates to objects, not to propositions [Locke, by Rorty]
     Full Idea: Locke didn't think of knowledge as true justified belief. …He considered "knowledge of" as prior to "knowledge that", and knowledge as a relation between persons and objects rather than persons and propositions.
     From: report of John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694]) by Richard Rorty - Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 3.2
     A reaction: This seems pretty close to Russell's 'knowledge by acquaintance'. You'd be a in a stronger position to build on this sort of thing if you were a direct realist about perception.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
10326 Other men's opinions don't add to our knowledge - even when they are true [Locke]
     Full Idea: The floating of other Mens Opinions in our brains makes us not one jot the more knowing, though they happen to be true.
     From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 1.04.23)
     A reaction: Kusch calls this thought of Locke's 'notorious'. Locke is certainly expressing extreme individualism in epistemology, and Kusch's views are the exact opposite. I'm more with Kusch.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
6488 Locke has no patience with scepticism [Locke, by Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: Locke has no patience with scepticism.
     From: report of John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694]) by Howard Robinson - Perception 1.4
     A reaction: Neither did Hume, and Aristotle laughs at extreme scepticism, and it never really bothers Plato. It could be argued that Descartes just regards it as a strategy for getting at foundations, rather than being something that kept him awake at night.