Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Herodotus, Aristotle and Amie L. Thomasson

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8 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
To know something we need understanding, which is grasp of the primary cause [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The point of our investigation is to acquire knowledge, and a prerequisite for knowing [eidenai] anything is understanding why it is as it is - in other words, grasping its primary cause.
     From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 194b18)
     A reaction: He then proceeds to identify four types of cause (Idea 8332). I can't think of a better account of knowledge. If we want to know that cigarettes cause cancer, we must get beyond the statistical correlation, and grasp the physical mechanisms.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Sceptics say justification is an infinite regress, or it stops at the unknowable [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Sceptics say that there is either an infinite regress of ideas based on one another, or things come to a stop at primitives which are unknowable (because they can't be demonstrated).
     From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 72b09)
     A reaction: This is one strand of what eventually becomes the classic Agrippa's Trilemma (Idea 8850). For Aristotle's view on this one, see Idea 562.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
When you understand basics, you can't be persuaded to change your mind [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Anyone who understands anything simpliciter (as basic) must be incapable of being persuaded to change his mind.
     From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 72b04)
     A reaction: A typical Aristotle test which seems rather odd to us. Surely I can change my mind, and decide that something is not basic after all? But, says Aristotle, then you didn't really think it was basic.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
The starting point of a proof is not a proof [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Who defines the healthy man, or who is awake or asleep? This is a pursuit of foundations, but this is seeking an account where there isn't one. The starting point of a proof is not a proof.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1011a10)
     A reaction: a comment on Descartes
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
Dreams aren't a serious problem. No one starts walking round Athens next morning, having dreamt that they were there! [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Is it really an issue whether things are true that appear to those asleep or to those awake? No one in Libya who dreamt he was in Athens, would set out for the Odeon next morning!
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1010b09)
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
If relativism is individual, how can something look sweet and not taste it, or look different to our two eyes? [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: If things are true relative to an individual, how can something seem honey to the sight but not to the taste, or, given that we have two eyes, things may not seem the same to the sight of both of them.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1011a24)
If truth is relative it is relational, and concerns appearances relative to a situation [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The claim that all appearances are true makes all things relational. Hence the claim is shifted to all appearances being true relative to a subject, time, sense and context.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1011a20)
     A reaction: applies to Epicurus
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
If the majority had diseased taste, and only a few were healthy, relativists would have to prefer the former [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: When two men taste the same thing one will often find it sweet and the other bitter. Suppose all men were sick, except one or two who were healthy. It would then be the latter two who would be considered sick, and the others not!
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1009b05)