Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Herodotus, Thomas Nagel and Ray Monk

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5 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
Epistemology is centrally about what we should believe, not the definition of knowledge [Nagel]
     Full Idea: The central problem of epistemology is what to believe and how to justify one's beliefs, not the impersonal problem of whether my beliefs can be said to be knowledge.
     From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], V.1)
     A reaction: Wrong. The question of whether what one has is 'knowledge' is not impersonal at all - it is having the social status of a knower or expert.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
We can't control our own beliefs [Nagel]
     Full Idea: Our beliefs are always due to factors outside of our control.
     From: Thomas Nagel (Moral Luck [1976], p.27)
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
Justifications come to an end when we want them to [Nagel]
     Full Idea: Justifications come to an end when we are content to have them end.
     From: Thomas Nagel (The Absurd [1971], §3)
     A reaction: This is the correct account, with the vital proviso that where justification comes to an end is usually a social matter. Robinson Crusoe doesn't care whether he 'knows' - he just acts on his beliefs.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Scepticism is based on ideas which scepticism makes impossible [Nagel]
     Full Idea: The sceptic reaches scepticism through thoughts that scepticism makes unthinkable.
     From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], V.6)
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
You would have to be very morally lazy to ignore criticisms of your own culture [Nagel]
     Full Idea: One would have to be very morally lazy to be unconcerned with the possibility that the prevailing morality of one's culture had something fundamentally wrong with it.
     From: Thomas Nagel (MacIntyre versus the Enlightenment [1988], 203)