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7070
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Kant says knowledge is when our representations sufficiently conform to our concepts [Kant, by Critchley]
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Full Idea:
Kant, in his epistemology, turns the issue of scepticism around by acknowledging that, although we can never know things-in-themselves, the objects of our representations conform to the concepts we have of them in a manner sufficient for knowledge.
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From:
report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro Ch.2
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A reaction:
This seems to invite the problem of a brain-in-a-vat, which is fed absurd representations, and set up with a bunch of silly concepts that conform to the representations.
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19509
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The indexical aspect of contextual knowledge might be hidden, or it might be in what 'know' means [Schiffer,S]
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Full Idea:
One might have a 'hidden-indexical' theory of knowledge sentences: they contain constituents that are not the semantic values of any terms; ...or 'to know' itself might be indexical, as in 'I know[easy] I have hands' or 'I know[tough] I have hands'.
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From:
Stephen Schiffer (Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism [1996], p.326-7), quoted by Keith DeRose - The Case for Contextualism 1.5
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A reaction:
[very compressed] Given the choice, I would have thought it was in 'know', since to say 'either you know p or you don't' sounds silly to me.
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4708
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Kant thought he had refuted scepticism, but his critics say he is a sceptic, for rejecting reality [O'Grady on Kant]
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Full Idea:
Kant believed he had given a decisive answer to traditional scepticism, since we can no longer be mistaken about objects, but his critics say he is a sceptic, because he relinquishes our grasp of independent things.
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From:
comment on Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.3
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A reaction:
A simple issue to raise about the man, my first reaction being that he is a sceptic. He says the 'noumenon' (true reality) is unknowable, but I say we can meaningfully speculate and theorise about it.
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6578
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For Kant, experience is relative to a scheme, but there are no further possible schemes [Kant, by Fogelin]
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Full Idea:
For Kant, experience is relativised to a categorial framework, but there is no further relativisation, at least in any deep respect, to a plurality of possible conceptual schemes.
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From:
report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.3
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A reaction:
This point is enlarged nicely by Davidson, in his view that we could make no sense of a different 'conceptual scheme' (Idea 6398). Kant's resistance to speculation prevents him imagining how it might be to be an angel, or an alien, or a Hopi.
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