Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Keith Lehrer, Paul O'Grady and Aristotle

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4 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
When you understand basics, you can't be persuaded to change your mind [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Anyone who understands anything simpliciter (as basic) must be incapable of being persuaded to change his mind.
     From: Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], 72b04)
     A reaction: A typical Aristotle test which seems rather odd to us. Surely I can change my mind, and decide that something is not basic after all? But, says Aristotle, then you didn't really think it was basic.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
The starting point of a proof is not a proof [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Who defines the healthy man, or who is awake or asleep? This is a pursuit of foundations, but this is seeking an account where there isn't one. The starting point of a proof is not a proof.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1011a10)
     A reaction: a comment on Descartes
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Justification is coherence with a background system; if irrefutable, it is knowledge [Lehrer]
     Full Idea: Justification is coherence with a background system which, when irrefutable, converts to knowledge.
     From: Keith Lehrer (Consciousness,Represn, and Knowledge [2006])
     A reaction: A problem (as the theory stands here) would be whether you have to be aware that the coherence is irrefutable, which would seem to require a pretty powerful intellect. If one needn't be aware of the irrefutability, how does it help my justification?
Coherence involves support from explanation and evidence, and also probability and confirmation [O'Grady]
     Full Idea: Coherentist justification is more than absence of contradictions, and will involve issues like explanatory support and evidential support, and perhaps issues about probability and confirmation too.
     From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.4)
     A reaction: Something like this is obviously essential. Is the notion of 'relevance' also needed (e.g. to avoid the raven paradox of induction)? Coherence of justification will combine with correspondence for truth.